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IN THE PUBLIC MIND a "deliberate and premeditated murder" in-
volves careful and precise planning by a cold, detached, ruthless
killer-the archetypal killing "in cold blood." This image has been
nurtured by literature, film, and popular culture of all forms, which
have long been preoccupied with such killers and their deeds-who
they are, where they come from, and the havoc they wreak on others.'
As a defining characteristic of aggravated murder within the legal
framework of homicide law, the phrase "deliberate and premeditated
murder" bears virtually no relationship to this popular image.
The phrase came into modern prominence in this country in
connection with an early movement to limit the use of the death pen-
alty. For centuries murder had been a unitary crime with all convicted
murderers subject to the death penalty.2 In 1794, with the express
purpose of limiting the death penalty, Pennsylvania became the first
* Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law; B.A., 1967, J.D., 1972,
University of California, Berkeley. The author would like to extend a special thanks to her
colleague, Steven F. Shatz, for his thoughtful input throughout the development of the
article. The author would also like to thank Magda Strojwas Wilkinson and Tara Jones
whose research assistance was invaluable.
1. Literature and film, both modern and classical, reveal the persistent fascination
with such killings. See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH; FYODOR DOSTOEVSKV,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT; TRUMAN CAPOTE, IN COLD BLOOD (Vintage Int'l 1994); COMPUL-
SION (20th Century Fox 1959) (based on the 1924 murder committed by Nathan Leopold,
Jr. and Richard Loeb); Rope (MCA 1948) (based on the 1924 murder committed by Na-
than Leopold, Jr. and Richard Loeb); CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS (MGM 1989); PATRICIA
HIGHSMITH, THE TALENTED MR. RIPLEY (Vintage Books 1992); THE TALENTED MR. RIPLEY
(Paramount Pictures 1999).
2. Murder has remained a unitary crime (i.e. one not divided into degrees) in En-
gland. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT 182-89 (1949-53).
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state to enact a statute that divided murder into degrees.3 The statute
defined three categories of first degree murder.4 Of those, "deliberate
and premeditated murder" was the category that applied most
broadly.
In 1856 California followed Pennsylvania's lead and enacted a
nearly identical statute. 5 When the statute was enacted and for more
3. The preamble to the Pennsylvania statute read:
Whereas the design of punishment is to prevent the commission of crimes, and
repair the injury that hath been done thereby to society or the individual, and it
hath been found by experience that the objects are better obtained by moderate
but certain penalties, than by severe and excessive punishments. And whereas it is
the duty of every government to endeavor to reform, rather than exterminate
offenders, and the punishment of death ought never to be inflicted, where it is
not absolutely necessary to the public safety ....
Pa. Laws 1794, ch. 257, §§ 1-2.
4. See Pa. Laws 1794, ch. 257, §§ 1, 2 (providing:
All murder, which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or
by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which shall
be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, rob-
bery, or burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree.)
5. California's statute provided:
All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, tor-
ture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which
shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape,
robbery or burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all other
kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree.
THE GENERAL LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS, 5 Div., § 21 (The-
odore H. Hittell ed., 1868). The statute, now Cal. Penal Code section 189, survives, un-
changed in all of its essential features. The statute has been altered in substance only by
the addition of several specified means and additions to the list of felonies. See infra text
accompanying notes 20-21.
Most other states also followed Pennsylvania's lead and enacted statutes that made
premeditated and deliberate murder first degree. See Herbert Wechsler &Jerome Michael,
A Rationale of the Law of Homicide I, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 701, 704-05 (1937) [hereinafter
Wechsler & Michael]. Even today more than half the states still use the presence of pre-
meditation and/or deliberation as a basis for establishing an aggravated form of murder,
either first degree murder or as a basis for making murder a capital offense: Arizona, ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 13-1105 (West 1991); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101 (Michie 1997);
Colorado, CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-102, 103 (Bradford Publishing Co. 2001); Delaware,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636 (Michie Supp. 2000); Florida, FLA. STAT. ch. 782.04 (West
Supp. 2002); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 18-4003 (Michie 1997); Illinois, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/
9-1 (West Supp. 2001); Iowa, IOWA CODE § 707.2 (West Supp. 2001); Kansas, KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 21-3401, 3439 (1996); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 407 (Lexis 2001); Mas-
sachusetts, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 265 § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1992); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.316 (Lexis 2001); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (West 1987); Mississippi, Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (West 1999); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (West 1999); Ne-
braska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-303 (1995); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (Lexis 2001);
New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-a (Michie 1996); New Mexico, N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-2-1 (Michie 2000); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Lexis 1999); Ohio,
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (Anderson 1999); Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 2502
(West 1998); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (Lexis 2000); South Dakota, S.D.
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than a hundred years thereafter, a verdict of first degree murder gave
the jury complete discretion as to whether to impose the death pen-
alty.6 Today, although no longer in itself a basis for the imposition of
the death penalty,7 conviction of first degree murder remains a neces-
sary predicate. 8 Furthermore, independent of possible death penalty
exposure, conviction of first degree murder has significant conse-
quences beyond conviction of second degree murder.9 Yet, during
most of the century and a half of the statute's history, deliberate and
premeditated first degree murder has been functionally indistinguish-
able from second degree intentional murder.
This problem is not new,10 nor is it unique to California." Virtu-
ally every jurisdiction with a similar statute has had the same experi-
CODIFIED LAws § 22-16-4 (Michie 1998); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202 (Lexis
Supp. 2001); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (Michie Supp. 1995); Virginia, VA.
CODE ANN. §18.2-32 (Michie 2001); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030 (West
2000); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-1 (Michie 2000); Wyoming, Wvo. STAT. ANN
§ 6-2-101 (Lexis 2001).
6. The constitutionality of this scheme was upheld in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183 (1971).
7. In 1972 the United States Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), a case that laid the groundwork for substantial change in the role of first degree
murder vis-a-vis the death penalty. Furman struck down the death penalty schemes of Geor-
gia and Texas, and by implication, those of other states as well. See id. Although the basis
for the Furman decision initially was unclear, later cases, particularly Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976), clarified that the constitutional defect lay in unguided juror discretion in
imposing the death sentence.
Although there is no indication that the imprecise definition of premeditation and
deliberation was considered explicitly, this inevitably amplified the problem of unguided
juror discretion by extending the possibility of a death sentence to a large segment of what,
in theory, was second degree murder.
Prior to the Furman decision the California Supreme Court had struck down the Cali-
fornia death penalty scheme on the grounds that it violated the state constitutional ban on
cruel and unusual punishment. See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972). In re-
sponse to this decision, the voters quickly amended the state constitution to provide that
the death penalty did not violate the ban on cruel and unusual punishment. See Steven F.
Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman ?, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1283, 1307 (1997) (providing a detailed history and analysis of California's death
penalty scheme) [hereinafter Shatz & Rivkind]. The legislature then responded by enact-
ing a mandatory death penalty upon conviction of first degree murder and one of ten
special circumstances. See id. After the Supreme Court declared mandatory death penalty
statutes unconstitutional in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), the legislature
enacted a new death penalty scheme, returning discretion to the jury but limiting that
discretion by requiring the jury to find one of twelve special circumstances before it could
consider imposing the death penalty. See Shatz & Rivkind, supra, at 1307.
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (Lexis Supp. 2002).
9. See id. (providing that first degree non-capital murder is punishable by a sentence
of twenty-five years to life; second degree murder by fifteen years to life).
10. SeeJames A. Pike, What Is Second Degree Murder in California?, 9 S. CAL. L. REV. 112
(1936); infra text accompanying notes 119-20.
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ence.12 The Model Penal Code abandoned the division of murder
into degrees and particularly noted the unsatisfactory history of pre-
meditation and deliberation as a basis for distinguishing between first
and second degree murder.13
The failure of the legal system meaningfully to implement the
division of murder into degrees can be explained, at least in part, by a
pervasive tension within homicide law. On the one hand, the law aims
to take into account the individual killer's comparative blameworthi-
ness resulting in the most characteristic feature of the modern homi-
cide scheme-its hierarchical structure of culpability.14 California's
homicide scheme, for example, defines three forms of manslaughter,
two degrees of murder, and further subdivides first degree murder
into capital and non-capital murder. 15 Possible punishment for these
varying forms of homicide can range from a relatively brief time in a
local jail for some forms of manslaughter, to the ultimate penalty of
death for the most culpable murders. 16
On the other hand, a murder represents a profound violation of
community standards and public response to that violation challenges
society's commitment to the individualized justice inherent in the
homicide law structure.' 7 If the killer is charged with or is convicted of
less than the maximum offense, this is often taken not as an indication
of the killer's relative lack of personal culpability, but rather as an
explicit devaluation of the life of the victim. A significant prison term,
even a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, may generate
a public response suggesting the killer has not been punished at all,
that he has somehow "gotten away with murder." The verdict must be
for murder, for first degree murder, for capital murder, and the sen-
tence must be death or cries are heard that "justice has not been
11. See Wechsler & Michael, supra note 5, at 707-09.
12. See, e.g., Mathew A. Pauley, Murder by Premeditation, 36 Am. CRIM. LAw REv. 145
(1999); Leo M. Romero, A Critique of the Willful, Deliberate, and Premeditated Formula for Distin-
guishing Between First and Second Degree Murder in New Mexico, 18 N.M. L. REv. 73 (1988);
Edwin R. Keedy, Histoly of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. PA. L.
Rev. 759 (1949). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 cmt. at 2 (1980) (recommending
elimination of the degrees of murder, based in part on the unsatisfactory nature of pre-
meditation and deliberation as a basis of distinction).
13. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 cmt. at 2 (1980).
14. See, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 350-55 (Little Brown & Co.
1978).
15. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187-89, 190.2, 192 (Lexis Supp. 2002).
16. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190, 193 (Lexis Supp. 2002).
17. See FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 235-38 (noting the continuing significance of the
historical conception of homicide as an attack on the sacred natural order).
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done." Particularly in the contemporary political context,18 such pub-
lic reaction creates a nearly irresistible pressure to expand the bound-
aries of more serious categories of homicide and in so doing,
undercuts the hierarchical structure of the overall scheme by a pro-
cess of upward leveling.
In California this tendency is visible on many fronts. Recent de-
cades have seen repeated actions both by the legislature and the elec-
torate to expand the categories of capital murder. Although originally
intended to limit the application of the death penalty to a small num-
ber of particularly heinous forms of first degree murder, the statutes
now define thirty-three separate ways to commit capital murder. 19
The same upward leveling is apparent in the statutory definition
of first degree murder itself. In the years since section 189 was en-
acted, eleven new forms of first degree murder have been added to
the statute, eight of those in the last twenty years. These have included
three new "means" provisions,20 as well as eight additional felony
murders.21 The legislature further expanded the reach of first degree
murder by abolishing defenses to premeditation and deliberation de-
veloped by the California Supreme Court.22
Judicial application of "deliberate and premeditated" first degree
murder also has been a mechanism for this upward leveling. Decisions
of the California Supreme Court always have paid lip service to the
need to distinguish between the degrees of murder, but the court by
and large has applied the statute in a manner that makes these de-
grees indistinguishable.
The executive branch recently made its own contribution to up-
ward leveling. Shortly after taking office, Governor Gray Davis an-
nounced he would deny parole to anyone sentenced to life
18. See discussion infra Part V.
19. See Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 7, at 1318.
20. These include murder perpetrated by means of "a destructive device or explo-
sive;" by "knowing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor,"
1982 Cal. Stat. 950, § 1 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (Lexis Supp.
2002)); and by "discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at a person
outside of the vehicle with the intent to cause death," 1993 Cal. Stat. 611, § 4.5 (codified as
amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (Lexis Supp. 2002)).
21. The additional felonies are carjacking, mayhem, kidnapping, trainwrecking, sod-
omy, lewd act on a child, oral copulation, and rape by instrument. Kidnapping, trainwreck-
ing, sodomy, oral copulation, and rape by instrument were added in 1990 by the electorate
in Proposition 115. See State of California, Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, Initiative
Measure Proposition 115, § 9 (approvedJune 5, 1990). Carjacking was added by the legisla-
ture in 1993. See 1994 Cal. Stat. 611, § 4. Lewd act on a child was added in 1990.
22. See 1981 Cal. Stat. 404, §§ 2, 4, 7 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 22,
28, 189 (Lexis Supp. 2002)). See also discussion infra Part V.
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imprisonment, 23 a category that includes those convicted both of first
and second degree murder. By this categorical opposition to parole,
Governor Davis functionally has imposed the same punishment for
both degrees of murder-life without the possibility of parole.24
Beyond this general tendency to expand the reach of aggravated
homicides, two more specific explanations for expansive judicial appli-
cation of the "deliberate and premeditated" requirement are sug-
gested. One is simply that there is no principled basis for
distinguishing between an intentional killing and one that is premedi-
tated and deliberated-i.e., that no matter how conscientiously a
court attempted to make this distinction, its efforts inevitably would
fail. In a nutshell the problem is as follows: A deliberate and premedi-
tated murder requires proof of express malice, generally understood
to mean simply an intent to kill.25 In order to form the intent to kill, a
person must, of course, make a decision; a decision can not be made
without at least rudimentary consideration of the alternatives. This
considering of the alternatives, to kill or not to kill, logically must pre-
cede the actual decision. Thus, the court is left with the unenviable
task of distinguishing between the decisionmaking inherent in form-
ing the intent to kill and the additional "premeditation and delibera-
tion" necessary to elevate the crime to first degree murder.26
23. Proposition 89, passed by the California electorate in 1988, gave the governor the
final decision regarding parole of convicted killers. See CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8b. Shortly
after his election, Governor Davis announced that no murderers would be paroled under
his watch. SeeJennifer Warren, Parole Board Defies Davis by Freeing Some Killers, L.A. TIMES,
July 23, 2001, at Al. See In re Rosenkrantz, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 279 (rejecting the Governor's
argument that his decision to deny parole is not reviewable).
24. Note that this is the same punishment given to those convicted of murder with
special circumstances who do not receive the death penalty. See In re Rosenkrantz, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 279 (2001). See also Kevin Livingston, A High Court Fight Over Killer's Parole, THE
RECORDER, June 27, 2001, at 1.
25. See People v. Saille, 820 P.2d 588, 594 (Cal. 1991).
26. Perhaps the best known articulation of this problem was made by Justice Benja-
min Cardozo:
Both first and second degree murder ... require an intent to kill, but in the one
instance it is deliberate and premeditated intent, and in the other it is not ....
The difficulty arises when we try to discover what is meant by the words deliberate
and premeditated. A long series of decisions, beginning many years ago, has given
to these words a meaning that differs to some extent from the one revealed upon
the surface. To deliberate and premeditate within the meaning of the statute, one
does not have to plan the murder days or hours or even minutes in advance ....
The human brain, we are reminded, acts at times with extraordinary celerity. All
that the statute requires is that the act must not be the result of immediate or
spontaneous impulse.
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A second possible explanation is that, regardless of the theoreti-
cal feasibility of drawing a distinct line, it has not been drawn because
the court is not convinced of its correlation to culpability. Decisions of
the court suggest this is at least a partial explanation. Where killings
are particularly heinous, despite the absence of any significant evi-
dence of premeditation and deliberation, the court regularly has up-
held first degree murder convictions by stretching both the facts and
the law to come to the desired outcome. 27
Regardless of the explanation, it is manifestly apparent that, for
most of their history in the California homicide scheme, use of these
elements has not distinguished meaningfully between first and second
degree murder.
This Article analyzes the history and evolution of premeditation
and deliberation as defining elements of first degree murder in Cali-
fornia, and proceeds as follows. Part I sets out a brief history of the
common law of homicide and the development of the elements of
premeditation and deliberation within that law, particularly as these
elements interconnect with malice aforethought, traditionally, and
still in California, the defining characteristic of murder.
Part II describes California's statutory scheme insofar as it relates
to premeditation and deliberation as defining elements of first degree
murder. It explores a fundamental ambiguity of the statutory
scheme-whether the designation of premeditated and deliberated
murder of the first degree was intended to identify one particular
form of malicious homicide from several existing forms as being the
most culpable, or was instead intended to identify a new, more aggra-
I think the distinction is much too vague to be continued in our law. There can
be no intent unless there is a choice, yet by the hypothesis, the choice without
more is enough to justify the inference that the intent was deliberate and premed-
itated. The presence of a sudden impulse is said to mark the dividing line, but
how can an impulse be anything but sudden when the time for its formation is
measured by the lapse of seconds? Yet the decisions are to the effect that seconds
are enough.
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, Wat Medicine Can Do for Law, in LAW AND LITERATURE 97-100
(Harcourt Brace & Co., 1931). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. at 4 (1980); Wechs-
ler & Michael, supra note 5, at 707-09 (1937); FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 255-56; Matthew
A. Pauley, Murder by Premeditation, 36 AM. CRAM. L. REv. 145, 162-64 (1999).
27. See discussion infra Part V. It would not be surprising if the legislature itself no
longer agreed with the statutory distinction but had not bothered to revise the relevant
statutes because the court essentially had done the legislature's work for it. In a number of
situations the legislature appears to have deferred to the court and then after the fact
either affirmed or repudiated the court's actions. See Suzanne Mounts, Malice Aforethought
in California: A History of Legislative Abdication and Judicial Vacillation, 33 U.S.F. L. REv. 313,
359 (1999).
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vated form of murder. Ultimately, this Article concludes that the latter
interpretation is the more plausible of the two.
Parts III, IV, and V explore three distinct phases in the California
Supreme Court's application of these elements. Part III covers the pe-
riod from 1856, when the predecessor of section 189 was adopted,
through 1944. During this long period the court did little to insure
any real distinction between the degrees of murder. First, the court
failed to clearly adopt either one or the other of the two possible in-
terpretations of the statutes discussed in Part II. Second, the court
obscured any potential difference between the two positions by re-
peated emphasis on the speed with which premeditation and delibera-
tion could be accomplished. Third, the court engaged in little or no
meaningful review of the factual sufficiency of first degree murder
convictions.
Part IV addresses the period from 1944 to 1980. In distinct con-
trast to the preceding period, the court actively undertook to clarify
the definition of premeditation and deliberation and the ambiguous
relationship of these elements to malice aforethought. This clarifica-
tion addressed both quantitative and qualitative aspects of premedita-
tion and deliberation. Further, during this period the court engaged
in significant oversight of jury decisions through review of evidentiary
sufficiency, culminating in the decision in case of People v. Anderson28
where the court articulated a three factor test for assessing evidentiary
sufficiency.
Part V covers the period from 1980 to the present. This part be-
gins with a discussion of the change in political climate in the early
1980s and the impact of that change on the California Supreme
Court. During this period the court made no doctrinal changes-it
neither revised jury instructions regarding proof of premeditation and
deliberation, nor offered an alternative to the Anderson test for review-
ing sufficiency of the evidence. Nonetheless, in a series of result-ori-
ented decisions, the court rejected challenges to evidentiary
sufficiency. These decisions, along with one additional decision in
which the court interpreted the law of conspiracy to commit murder,
have effectively returned the law to the state it was in during the earli-
est period, that is, when first and second degree murder essentially
were indistinguishable and the decision regarding the degree of mur-
der was left entirely to the discretion of the jury.
28. 447 P.2d 942 (Cal. 1968).
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This Article concludes that the legislature should revisit both the
specific decision to make premeditation and deliberation distinguish-
ing elements of first degree murder, as well as the division of murder
into degrees generally. California's one hundred and fifty years of ex-
perience with premeditation and deliberation suggests these elements
will not consistently be applied on a principled basis. Furthermore,
there is a considerable question as to whether these elements necessa-
rily identify the most culpable murders. On the general question of
whether murder should be divided into degrees, the law's develop-
ment in the wake of the decision in Furman v. Georgia29 has under-
mined the rationale for that division. Such questions are clearly
appropriate for legislative resolution; however the California legisla-
ture has long ignored these and other issues regarding the state's
homicide law. Because there is little reason to anticipate that the legis-
lature will act on this in the near future, 30 the statute in its current
form will continue to appear on the court's agenda. The court must
apply this statute so as to maintain a principled distinction between
the degrees of murder, both in articulated legal doctrine and eviden-
tiary review.
I. Common Law Origins
The roots of premeditation and deliberation as characteristics
identified with an aggravated form of murder lie in the earliest days of
the common law of homicide. Initially, neither the method of killing
nor the mental state with which the killing was carried out affected
liability. Prior to the twelfth century, as long as a person caused the
death of another, he was responsible. 31 In this early period homicide
was not a "crime" in the modern sense of an offense against the state.
Most "wrongs" of the time, including homicide, were matters to be
settled between the individuals involved, or in the case of homicide,
with the kin of the person killed. With the exception of the most ag-
gravated forms, homicide could be settled through "emendments" or
payments to the relatives of the person killed. 32 Over time a more
29. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See supra text accompanying note 7.
30. The legislature has ignored profound problems throughout the entire homicide
scheme which is long overdue for a complete overhaul. See generally Mounts, supra note 27.
31. This was true even if the killing was entirely accidental or committed in self-de-
fense. See II FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
(2d ed.) 479-83 (1968) [hereinafter POLLOCK & MAITLAND]; Roy MORELAND, THE LAW OF
HOMICIDE 1-2 (1952).
32. In this early period no clear distinction existed between the law of torts or civil
wrongs and the law of crimes. A wrong to the social order elicited one of four responses:
Winter 2002]
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complex system developed that included compensation not only to
kin, but also to the lord and to the king.33
Certain forms of aggravated homicide were never emendable. 34
Initially, homicides were distinguished based on the means used to
carry out the killing-those committed by secrecy, under cover of
night, or otherwise untraceable to the perpetrator were subject to
punishment by death and not resolvable through emendment. A kill-
ing committed by stealth or secrecy implied reflection, planning, and
lack of spontaneity by the perpetrator, but the mental attitude toward
the killing was not the basis for defining the killing as aggravated.
Rather, these killings were viewed as aggravated because they caught
the victim off guard and deprived him of the opportunity to defend
himself.3 5 The term "murder" or "murdrum," which later came to be
associated with a broad spectrum of aggravated homicides, originated
from the more ancient "morth," an expression that applied to secret
crimes generally. 36 The expression "morth-works" referred to so-called
"deeds of darkness. ''37 The term "moro" appears to have been used to
describe homicides committed secretly;38 a typical case involved a kill-
ing by means of poison.3 9
(1) outlawry-the offender was excluded from the protections of the law, and the citizenry
entitled and obligated to pursue and slay the offender and to take his land and other
possessions; (2) "blood-feud"-the kin were authorized to revenge themselves; (3) the tar-
iffs or fines of bot and wite, and (4) death or some other form of physical punishment. See
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 449-51. With the exception of killings that were
particularly aggravated, homicides could be settled through financial compensation. The
fact that a serious offense such as homicide could be settled by a payment of money or
property might seem surprising; this leniency probably was due to the influence of the
church. Death was a convenient punishment for a society without prisons or penitentiaries,
but the church was generally opposed to bloodshed and favored a system of atonement. See
id. at 452.
33. See id. at 458. The payment to the kin was the wer, to the lord was the manbot, and
to the king the wite. See id.
34. See id. at 451. "Clearly a mere willful homicide, when there has been no treachery,
no sorcery, no concealment of the corpse, no sacrilege, no breach of royal safe-conduct, is
not unemendable." Id. at 458.
35. SeeJOHN G. BELLAMY, CRIME AND PUBLIC ORDER IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE
AGES 53-54 (Routledge & Kegan Paul eds., 1973).
36. SeeJ. F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 25, 28 (MacMillan
& Co. ed., 1883).
37. See STEPHEN, supra note 36, at 25. Secrecy seems generally to have been an aggra-
vating circumstance. For example, in early history theft was considered to be more dishon-
orable than robbery because robbery was the open crime, whereas theft involved stealth.
See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 493-94.
38. The use of this term seems to have predated the division of unlawful homicide
into murder and manslaughter. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 485-86.
39. See id. at 458 n.1. Early laws designated as "inexpiable" killings by "poison, witch-
craft, or fascination," a list that reveals something of the world view of the time and of
[Vol. 36
Following the Norman invasion of England, the term "murder"
came to be associated particularly with killings committed while "lying
in wait."40 Anglo-Saxon hatred of the conquering Normans often was
expressed in secret killings accomplished by lying in wait.4 ' Such kill-
ings were particularly troublesome to the Norman monarchs, who re-
sponded by imposing a heavy fine called the "murdrum," which was
imposed on the community if the killer was not produced. 42 The fine
was abolished by statute in 1340.43 The term "murder" lived on, and
was associated with what was imprecisely defined as the worst forms of
unlawful homicide. 44
The common law moved gradually away from this emphasis on
the means of the killing, such as secrecy, crime of the night, poison-
ing, or lying in wait, and under the influence of Roman and Canon
law, began to focus on the mental state with which the killing was
done, particularly on the moral blameworthiness associated with that
mental state. Homicide, along with other offenses, increasingly be-
came a matter of state concern. 45 No matter what its form, homicide
was a capital crime, punishable by death or mutilation; thus homicide
was no longer emendable in any form, and further, the kin of the
person slain were not entitled to compensation of any sort.46 Ulti-
mately, the requirement of moral blame was incorporated into "mal-
ice aforethought," the defining element of murder at common law.
The history of premeditation and deliberation is closely tied to the
history of malice aforethought which, in turn, is tied to "benefit of
clergy."
"Benefit of clergy" developed in the middle ages as a device for
ameliorating the harshness of criminal penalties.47 Between 1496 and
societal concerns that caused secret killings to be seen as more aggravated than other
forms of unlawful killing. STEPHEN, supra note 36, at 27. Killings by poison continued to
have a special status. In 1530, a statute was passed making the offense of poisoning high
treason, with a penalty of death by boiling. See STEPHEN, supra note 36, at 44.
40. See MORELAND, supra note 31, at 9.
41. See id.
42. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 487.
43. See id. at 488.
44. See STEPHEN, supra note 36, at 40.
45. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 458; MORELAND, supra note 31, at 5.
46. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 459, 483. The system of payment was at
best hypocritical even before this change; the tariff amounts were far beyond the capacity
of the average individual to pay, and when the offender failed to make the payment, he was
either outlawed or sold as a slave. See id. at 460.
47. Benefit of clergy has been described as follows:
In ancient times the lay courts did not have criminal jurisdiction over the clergy
in felony cases. The members of the clergy could be tried only in the ecclesiastical
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1547 a series of statutes were passed excluding from benefit of clergy
certain forms of unlawful homicides. The excluded homicides were
referred to as "murder[s] committed with malice aforethought. '" 48
While these homicides continued to be punishable by death, other
unlawful homicides came to be known as manslaughter and were pun-
ished by a brand on the brawn of the thumb and imprisonment for no
more than a year.49
The term "malice aforethought" emerged substantially prior to
the time of its role vis-a-vis benefit of clergy. 50 Although its origins are
long since lost in time, and its meaning in the early law of homicide is
subject to controversy, most agree that at one period in its develop-
ment, the meaning of malice aforethought was relatively literal, re-
quiring proof of "ill will existing prior to the killing" and was
distinguished from deliberate killings resulting from an instantaneous
decision. 51 Thus, murder was being defined by the presence of prior
reflection; i.e., "premeditated" killings were murder, "unpremedi-
tated" killings were manslaughter. 52 In fact, the terms malice and pre-
meditation were often used interchangeably- malice prepense and
malice aforethought.53
The law failed to maintain the distinction between intentional
killings that were premeditated and those that were spontaneous or
unpremeditated. 54 An important step away from that distinction came
via the law's willingness to infer malice in sudden killings without
prior provocation.5 5 As a purely factual matter, this inference made
court and could be punished only by such penalty as that court could inflict. It
was an "elementary rule that the church would never pronounce a judgment of
blood," and ... the chief characteristic of benefit of clergy was that it shielded
those who qualified for its protection from the capital ... punishment which was
otherwise a necessary consequence of felony convictions.
Rollin M. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 542 (1934)
(footnotes omitted). Originally, benefit of clergy was limited to members of the clergy;
later its protection was extended to all persons who could read. See id.
48. Perkins, supra note 47, at 543; MORELAND, supra note 31, at 9.
49. See Perkins, supra note 47, at 544. The brand was to insure that a person did not
receive benefit of clergy more than once. See J.M. Kaye, The Early History of Murder and
Manslaughter, 83 L.Q. RFv. 365 (1967).
50. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 485.
51. Perkins, supra note 47, at 545-46.
52. See Kaye, supra note 49, at 365. Malice aforethought evolved in conjunction with
the early form of self-defense (homicide se defendendo). In order to raise the defense, the
accused was required to show that the killing was done in self-defense and not by felony or
with "malice aforethought." See STEPHEN, supra note 36, at 41; Kaye, supra note 49, at 373.
53. See Kaye, supra note 49, at 365.
54. See id. at 365-66.
55. See Perkins, supra note 47, at 546-48.
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some sense. When a person suddenly killed another and the sur-
rounding circumstances suggested no reason for the killing, it was
often true that a previous grudge or misunderstanding led the perpe-
trator to plan the killing. Of course, this was not always the case; some-
times a killing resulted simply from a sudden decision that was both
unplanned and unprovoked. However, the courts came to treat this
inference as one of law rather than of fact, and in the process, in-
cluded within the definition of malice aforethought killings which did
not result from prior planning.
The process of expansion continued. Other kinds of unplanned
killings were included within the definition of malice aforethought,
including killings done with an "abandoned and malignant heart"-
killings that not only were not planned, but also not done with an
intent to kill. 56 The expression "malice aforethought" lost all sem-
blance of connection to the meaning of the words themselves and
evolved into a term of art, encompassing mental states that required
no proof either of "malice" or "forethought"-in other words,
premeditation.
The modern elements of premeditation and deliberation bear a
strong resemblance to the early, more literal version of malice afore-
thought. This resemblance has caused considerable confusion in con-
temporary attempts to distinguish first and second degree murder,
both of which require proof of malice aforethought.5 7 However, to
consider the distinction between degrees of murder is to get ahead of
things because the common law recognized no divisions within the
law of murder; that step was accomplished by statute.
H. The Statutory Foundation-Premeditation and
Deliberation Within the Homicide Scheme
In 1856, California enacted Penal Code section 21, later reen-
acted as section 189, which divided murder into two degrees as
follows:
All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in
wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and pre-
meditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration
or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, shall
56. See id. at 552-57.
57. See discussion infra Part II.
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be deemed murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of mur-
der shall be deemed murder in the second degree.5 8
Like the nearly identical Pennsylvania statute on which it was
modeled,5 9 California's statute designated as first degree any murder
that was premeditated and deliberated, that was perpetrated by speci-
,fied means, or that occurred during certain enumerated felonies.60
With no further definition, the statute provided that any form of mur-
der not specifically listed was second degree. 6' The statute did not
change the pre-existing definition of murder, nor did it affect other
aspects of the interrelated homicide scheme. Consideration of the
broader structure of California's homicide law helps put this statute,
particularly the designation of premeditated and deliberated murder
as first degree, in perspective.
California defines murder as a killing with malice aforethought.6 2
Malice aforethought, in turn, is defined as follows: "[Mlalice may be
express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate
intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is
implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when the cir-
cumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant
heart. '63 As applied, the statutory definitions mean that express mal-
ice exists when a killing is done with the intent to kill and without any
58. THE GENERAL LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS, 5TH DIV.,
§ 21 (Theodore H. Hittell ed., 1868).
59. See supra note 4. The only significant difference between the California and Penn-
sylvania statutes was the addition to the California statute of murder by "torture" to the list
of specified means included in first degree murder.
60. Section 189 provides that murders committed in certain felonies are first degree
murders-i.e., it does not by its literal language include the felony murder rule which
makes any killing committed in the course of a felony, murder. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189
(Lexis Supp. 2002). In People v. Dillon, the court reviewed the history of felony murder and
held that section 189 codifies the felony murder rule. See People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697,
715 (Cal. 1983). The history as laid out by the court in Dillon suggests that the problem lay
in the transition from California's early partial code, which included section 21, to the new
complete code adopted in 1872 that included section 189. See id. at 714-15.
61. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (Lexis Supp. 2002).
62. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (Lexis Supp. 2002).
63. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (Deering 1985). Section 188 goes on to provide:
When it is shown that the killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act
with express or implied malice.., no other mental state need be shown to estab-
lish ... malice aforethought. Neither an awareness of the obligation to act within
the general body of laws regulating society nor acting despite such awareness is
included within the definition of malice.
Id. This provision was added by the legislature in 1981 in order to repudiate the decision in
People v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1966).
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legally recognized mitigating or exonerating circumstances, 64 and im-
plied malice exists when a killing results from a highly dangerous act
done with awareness of that danger. 65 Thus, a malicious killing can be
either intentional or unintentional-both are equally murder. To pre-
meditate and deliberate about killing, one must inevitably have a "de-
liberate intention" to kill-i.e., express malice. Thus, all premeditated
and deliberated murders are committed with express, not implied
malice.
Manslaughter is distinguished from murder by the absence of
malice aforethought.66 Manslaughter is itself subdivided into three
forms, voluntary, involuntary, and vehicular.67 The latter two forms of
manslaughter do not include the intent to kill, and therefore bear no
relationship to premeditated and deliberated killings. Voluntary man-
slaughter generally, though not inevitably, includes the intent to kill.68
Thus, California's homicide scheme clearly includes intentional
manslaughter and intentional murder. Whether it also includes two
degrees of intentional murder is less clear, both in theory and prac-
tice. Two different interpretations of the relevant statutes are at least
plausible. First, when the legislature designated premeditated and de-
liberated murder as first degree, it may have intended to identify a
new, aggravated form of intentional murder, one which required
mental elements beyond express malice. Under this interpretation, a
"bare" intentional killing would be second degree murder. An inten-
tional killing committed in the heat of passion caused by adequate
provocation (and thus without deliberate intention) would be volun-
64. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (Deering 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (Lexis Supp.
2002); People v. Saille, 820 P.2d 588 (Cal. 1991); In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574 (Cal.
1994). See generally Mounts, supra note 27, at 359-69.
65. See Mounts, supra note 27, at 369-73.
66. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (Lexis Supp. 2002).
67. See id.
68. Voluntary manslaughter is defined as an unlawful killing without malice afore-
thought, resulting from a heat of passion caused by adequate provocation. See §§ 188, 192.
Recently the California Supreme Court confirmed that voluntary manslaughter does not
inevitably include the intent to kill. See People v. Blakeley, 999 P.2d 675 (Cal. 2000); People
v. Lasko, 999 P.2d 666 (Cal. 2000). However, typically the killing is intentional-the killer
experiences some form of intense provocation that creates a highly volatile emotional
state, which in turn leads to the decision to kill.
The California Supreme Court has also reaffirmed the existence of another form of
voluntary manslaughter-a killing done with an unreasonable belief in the need to use
deadly force in self-defense, so-called "imperfect self-defense." See In re Christian S., 872
P.2d 574, 583 (Cal. 1994). Section 192 contains no reference to imperfect self-defense; the
court appears to have relied on common law and section 188's definition of express malice
in recognizing this form of manslaughter. See Christian S., 872 P.2d at 576-81.
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tary manslaughter. If the killing was intentional and that intent re-
sulted from significant forethought (premeditation) and careful
consideration of alternative courses of action (deliberation), it would
be first degree murder.
As the following chart illustrates, this first interpretation results in
three forms of intentional unlawful homicide-first degree murder,
second degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter.
Aggravated Express Malice = First Degree Murder
First degree murder 0 express malice* PLUS premeditation and deliberation
Second degree murder e express malice* [OR implied malice-upon an
abandoned and malignant heart-i.e., WITHOIUT intent to
kill]
voluntary manslaughter 0 killing upon adequate provocation resulting in a heat
of passion**
* defined as deliberate intent unlawfully to kill
** a heat of passion killing generally, though not
inevitably, is done with intent to kill
An alternative interpretation would suggest that, rather than
identifying a new form of murder, the legislature simply intended to
select one form of murder as the most aggravated from those forms
already recognized. That is to say, the legislature intended to desig-
nate malicious intentional killings (express malice) as first degree mur-
der and all other malicious killings (implied malice) as second
degree. Thus, only two forms of intentional homicides would exist-
first degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. If intent to kill is
mitigated (i.e., is without malice), the killing would be voluntary man-
slaughter; if not, it would be first degree murder.
Express Malice = First Degree Murder
First degree murder * express malice* EQUALS deliberation and
premeditation
Second degree murder * implied malice-upon an abandoned and malignant
heart [i.e., WITHOUT intent to kill]
voluntary manslaughter * killing upon adequate provocation resulting in a heat
of passion**
* defined as deliberate intent unlawfully to kill
** a heat of passion killing generally, though not
inevitably, is done with intent to kill
At first impression, section 189 seems more consistent with the
first interpretation-the intent to identify a new form of aggravated
murder. Nothing in the statute refers to express malice, nor suggests a
legislative intent to select among theories of malice. If the legislature
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intended to make killings with express malice first degree murder,
would it not have simply said so?
Closer consideration of the wording of section 189, particularly in
connection with the definition of express malice in section 188, lends
some support to the second interpretation. Section 189 used three
adjectives to identify this form of first degree murder-"willful," "de-
liberate," and "premeditated." From the beginning, "willful" has been
interpreted to mean nothing more than "intentional,"69 already a re-
quirement of express malice ("deliberate intention unlawfully to
kill"). The second adjective, "deliberate," also appeared in the defini-
tion of express malice. 70 So of the three adjectives, only "premedita-
tion" apparently added to what was already required for express
malice. Premeditation might be read to require significant advance
planning or foresight, in which case it added to what was required for
express malice. However, premeditation might also mean simply "to
think of beforehand," in which case premeditation would differ little,
if at all, from the simple act of making the decision inherent in form-
ing intent to kill. So on its face the wording of section 189 was not
inconsistent with the second interpretation.7 '
The history of malice also lends some support to this latter inter-
pretation. As discussed in Part I, the element of malice aforethought
originally meant something akin to the common understanding of the
constituent words-ill will, conceived beforehand. In turn, this defini-
tion is similar to the meaning of the deliberate and premeditated lan-
guage of the new statute. In fact, historically the expressions malice
aforethought and malice prepense were used interchangeably.7 2 Over the
centuries malice aforethought came to include other mental states
69. See People v. Bealoba, 17 Cal. 389, 394 (1861); People v. Saille, 820 P.2d 588 (Cal.
1991); Mounts, supra note 27, at 323-39, 360-69.
70. The court has consistently rejected arguments that the word "deliberate" in ex-
press malice adds anything to the intent to kill. See, e.g., Saille, 820 P.2d at 595.
71. Interestingly, despite nearly a century and a half of dispute regarding premedita-
tion and deliberation, the court has paid little attention to the actual language of the
relevant statutes. Perhaps this is because the court agrees with this author that, because of
the common law roots of California's homicide statutes, this sort of statutory analysis is not
terribly productive. See generally, Mounts, supra note 27.
72. According to Moreland, the most striking thing about the Pennsylvania statute was
its substitution of word "premeditation" for the common law word "aforethought." See
MORELAND, supra note 31, at 200. He went on to note that although the dictionary defini-
tion of both words is the same, "aforethought," as used in the common law crime of mur-
der, had been "drained of its natural meaning" and had become "an empty word." Id. The
law makers "substituted another word which in its natural sense has exactly the same con-
notation of pre-design . . . [and] in effect, resurrected the original meaning of 'afore-
thought."' Id.
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having nothing to do with a planned or preconceived idea of killing. 73
Given this evolution, the legislature might logically have identified the
foundational form of malice-express malice or the "deliberate inten-
tion unlawfully to kill"-as first degree murder and left later-devel-
oped theories of malice as murder in the second degree.74
Despite these arguments, on balance, the interpretation sug-
gesting the creation of a new aggravated form of murder seems more
plausible. If the legislature meant to make all intentional murder first
degree, it seems improbable that it would have chosen such an indi-
rect way of saying so. It could simply have said "murders committed
with express malice are of the first degree." In addition, the reitera-
tion that the killing had to be "willful, deliberate, and premeditated"
suggests that substantially more than the deliberate intent to kill was
intended. For most of the history of this statute, the court has agreed,
at least nominally, that this was the legislature's intention.
Prior to 1856 when the California legislature enacted its own de-
gree-fixing statute, Pennsylvania case law had already revealed the in-
herent ambiguity of such a statute.7 5 Rather than using this advance
notice to avoid the same pitfall, the California legislature simply en-
acted a duplicate of Pennsylvania's statute. In 1872, when it incorpo-
rated the statute into California's new comprehensive Penal Code, the
legislature again had an opportunity to consider the first degree/sec-
ond degree murder distinction; instead, it re-enacted the earlier stat-
ute without change. Additionally, from 1872 to the present, the
legislature has done nothing to address this basic structural flaw in the
statute.76 Legislative inaction left the problem at the court's doorstep.
73. See discussion supra Part I. See also Mounts, supra note 27, at 317-20.
74. If this interpretation was adopted, the court might then have had to give some
real meaning to "deliberate" in the definition of express malice. To date, this term has
been given no significance in the definition of express malice. See, e.g., Saille, 820 P.2d at
594.
75. See Edwin R. Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97
U. PA. L. REv. 759, 773-77 (1949) (citing Pennsylvania v. M'Fall, Add. 255 (Pa. 1794);
Republica v. Mulatto Bob, 4 Dall. 145 (Pa. 1795); Pennsylvania v. Lewis, Add. 279 (Pa.
1796); Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 7 Smith, Laws of Pa. (1807)).
76. The only action by the legislature during this entire time was an amendment to
the statute explicitly repudiating one decision of the court. See discussion infra Part V. This
legislative neglect extends to virtually all aspects of California's homicide scheme. See
Mounts, supra note 27, at 352-75.
[Vol. 36
DELIBERATE AND PREMEDITATED MURDER
Il. Premeditated and Deliberated Murder Applied-1856 to
1944
For the better part of a century, three aspects of California Su-
preme Court decisions applying premeditation and deliberation com-
bined to ensure that the division of murder into degrees had little
meaningful effect. First, the court never clearly adopted either one or
the other of the possible interpretations of the statute; its statements
on the issue were consistent only in their inconsistency. Second, the
theoretical difference between the two positions was undermined by
emphasis on the speed with which premeditation and deliberation
could be accomplished. Third, the court engaged in little meaningful
review of factual sufficiency of first degree murder convictions.
A. An Unsettled Start
In People v. Bealoba,77 the first case to apply the new statute, the
court described its goal as insuring that "the doctrine [regarding the
degrees of murder] may be definitely settled, and be ... of easy com-
prehension. ' ' 78 In retrospect, this goal seems remarkably hopeful and
naive. Instead, the Bealoba decision, in combination with a second case
decided only three years later, People v. Sanchez,7 9 insured precisely the
opposite-that the doctrine would be definitely unsettled and nearly
impossible to comprehend.
On the distinction between first and second degree murder, the
trial court in Bealoba instructed the jury as follows:
[T] he difference between murder in the first and second degree is
so subtle as frequently to puzzle the mind, and render difficult the
solution. When the term premeditation or deliberation is used, the
juror is apt to consider that some time is necessary for deliberation;
but this is not necessary; it is only requisite that the design to kill
has been formed, and it may be executed in a minute, in an hour,
or a day, and it is murder; while in all cases of murder in the sec-
ond degree there must not be any mixture of deliberation .... The
first inquiry, therefore, of a California jury, after a felonious and
malicious homicide is established, and not committed by means of
poison or lying in wait, is to determine whether the mortal shot was
fired with intent to take life, or merely to do bodily harm; if with
the intent to take life, it is murder in the first degree; if merely to
inflict bodily harm, it is only murder in the second degree.8 0
77. 17 Cal. 389 (1861).
78. Id. at 399.
79. 24 Cal. 17 (1864).
80. Bealoba, 17 Cal. at 393.
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The instruction made two key points: (1) that no particular
length of time was required to deliberate and premeditate on killing;
and (2) the distinction between first and second degree murder was
based on the intent to kill versus the intent to do bodily harm.
The California Supreme Court found no error with either aspect
of the instruction. The court first noted that, absent mitigation suffi-
cient to reduce the homicide to voluntary manslaughter, proof of in-
tent to kill established first degree murder.8' The statute, of course,
required elements that the killing be "willful," "deliberate," and "pre-
meditated." The Bealoba court concluded that all these adjectives were
"nearly synonymous," 82 and underscored this point when it observed
that
[a] man may do a thing willfully, that is, intentionally and deliber-
ately, from a moment's reflection, as well as after pondering over
the subject for a month or a year; he can premeditate, that is, think
before doing the act, the moment he conceives the purpose, as
well as if the act were the result of long preconcert or
preparation .83
Although the court never said so explicitly, its elaboration of the
meaning of willful, deliberate, and premeditated suggested these
terms were indistinguishable from the "deliberate intention" of ex-
press malice.
81. The opinion relied on the early Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Green. The
Green decision described the purpose of Pennsylvania's nearly identical statute as being to
limit the common law doctrine of "constructive murder," and observed that, under the
new statute, to constitute murder of the first degree the unlawful killing must be done with
a "clear intent to take life." The Green opinion described the law of England as including
within the crime of murder unlawful acts of violence resulting in death where there was no
intent to kill, but rather only an intent to do bodily harm-this being the doctrine of
"constructive malice." The court said that in Pennsylvania this "constructive malice" or the
intent to do bodily harm established only second degree murder. In approving the above
instruction, the Bealoba court approved the same distinction between the intent to kill and
intent to do bodily harm under the California statute. See id. at 395.
82. Id. at 394.
83. Id. The court's comments regarding the lack of a specified time required for pre-
meditation and deliberation continued:
There is nothing in the statute which indicates that the Legislature meant to as-
sign any particular period to this process of deliberation or premeditation, in
order to bring the act within the first degree. Nor could it well have done so. A
ruffian, out of mere wantonness, firing into a crowd upon a sudden motion, is as
guilty as if he had lain in wait for his victim.
Id. The last sentence exemplifies the imprecision that often characterizes the court's con-
sideration of premeditation and deliberation and the inter-relationship of these elements
with malice aforethought. Having first taken the questionable step of equating premedita-
tion and deliberation with express malice, the court here used an example of what was
probably an implied malice murder to justify its conclusion that express malice/premedita-
tion and deliberation could be accomplished instantaneously. See id.
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Sanchez, decided a mere three years later, proceeded on a differ-
ent course. In this case the trial court instructed the jury that "murder
is divided into two degrees-the first includes every unlaw[ful] killing
of a human being done maliciously or intentionally."84 Even under
Bealoba's standard, in allowing a first degree murder conviction for a
killing that was either malicious or intentional, this instruction was in-
correct. First, because malice includes unintentional as well as inten-
tional killings, this instruction allowed conviction of first degree
murder with no proof of intent to kill. Second, the instruction erred
in allowing a first degree murder conviction for any intentional kill-
ing; some intentional killings, such as those committed upon ade-
quate provocation in a heat of passion, are manslaughter rather than
murder.85 The Sanchez court thus held that the prior instruction was
clearly erroneous.
The court then went on to describe what was required for a first
degree murder. The court noted that second degree murder must be
done with malice and may include the intent to kill, and that in order
to be first degree murder, the killing must be more than intentional
and malicious. 86 Relying on the legislative purpose in dividing murder
(identifying the most aggravated forms of murder) and the overall
structure of the statute that included three forms of first degree mur-
der, the court suggested all forms of first degree murder must reflect
similar culpability. 87 Two of the forms, the various atrocious means
(poison, torture, and lying in wait) and murder in the course of an
enumerated felony, carried what the court referred to as "conclusive
evidence of premeditation." 88 The third category, described by the
court as a "much larger class of cases ... which are of equal cruelty
and aggravation," 89 required independent proof of a "deliberate and
preconceived intent to kill."
Thus, according to the Sanchez decision, proof of an unmitigated
intentional killing was not, on that basis, sufficient to sustain a convic-
84. People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17, 28 (1961).
85. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (Lexis Supp. 2001).
86. See Sanchez, 24 Cal. at 28.
87. See id. at 28-29.
88. Id. at 29. Courts in this era often spoke in terms of "conclusive presumptions."
However, it is more accurate to say that, for killings by atrocious means and during the
course of enumerated felonies, no premeditation or deliberation need be proved. Particu-
larly in the felony murder context it seems ludicrous to say that there is a conclusive pre-
sumption of premeditation since even accidental killings can be punished as felony
murder.
89. Id. at 29 (construing the statute so as to achieve overall equivalence-i.e., to en-
sure that all first degree murders were of comparable "cruelty and aggravation").
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tion of first degree murder. Something more, a "deliberate and
preconceived intent to kill," had to be proven to elevate the inten-
tional murder from second to first degree. 90 The line drawn by the
Sanchez court-between intent to kill and "deliberate and precon-
ceived intent to kill"-was clearly different than the line drawn by the
court in Bealoba-between the intent to kill and the intent to inflict
bodily injury.91
The court described any difficulty in drawing a distinction be-
tween an intentional second degree murder and a deliberate premed-
itated first degree murder as "more apparent than real."92 In
describing the grounds for distinction, the court said the following:
The unlawful killing must be accompanied with a deliberate and
clear intent to take life, in order to constitute murder of the first
degree. The intent to kill must be the result of deliberate premedi-
tation; it must be formed upon a pre-existing reflection and not
upon a sudden heat of passion sufficient to preclude the idea of
deliberation. 93
The court's reassurance regarding the ease of line drawing
turned out to be poorly grounded, and its attempt at guidance raised
as many questions as it answered. First, the court said that the intent
to take life must be "deliberate" and "clear." What did these require-
ments add over and above the "deliberate intention unlawfully to take
life" necessary for express malice?94 Since both must be "deliberate," it
was difficult to see much difference. Did the requirement that the in-
tent be "clear" add anything? Intent to kill is the critical element of
second degree murder. Presumably, a second degree murder convic-
tion would have to be based on "clear" proof of intent to kill. Second,
the court said the intent to kill must be the result of deliberate pre-
meditation. 95 This, of course, merely repeated the words of the stat-
ute. Finally, the court said the intent must be formed on "pre-existing
reflection" and "not upon a sudden heat of passion." 96 The idea that
the killing must be formed upon pre-existing reflection sounds help-
ful; it suggests the idea of at least some prior consideration of the
decision. The court contrasted such prior reflection with the existence
of a "sudden heat of passion sufficient to preclude the idea of deliber-
90. See id. at 30.
91. Although the court decided Beoloba only three years earlier, it makes no mention
of that decision in its Sanchez opinion.
92. Sanchez, 24 Cal. at 30.
93. Id.
94. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (Lexis Supp. 2002).
95. See Sanchez, 24 Cal. at 30.
96. Id.
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ation. ''9 7 On the surface this also seems to make sense-cool reflec-
tion as contrasted to heat of passion. However, in actuality the
historical role of "heat of passion" has been to differentiate between
voluntary manslaughter and murder-to establish the presence or ab-
sence of malice aforethought, not premeditation and deliberation. By allud-
ing to heat of passion as the contrast to premeditation and
deliberation, the court further muddied the distinctions between
these three intentional homicides-first and second degree murder
and voluntary manslaughter.98 So, despite the court's apparent posi-
tion that first degree murder required proof of something more than
intent to kill, the nature of that "something more" remained unclear.
One last element of the Sanchez decision undermined prospects
for a clear distinction between intent to kill and premeditation and
deliberation. In language that was reiterated for decades, the court
emphasized the speed with which this "deliberate and preconceived
intent to kill" could be formed, stating:
There need be no appreciable space of time between the intention
to kill and the act of killing; they may be as instantaneous as succes-
sive thoughts of the mind. It is only necessary that the act of killing
be preceded by a concurrence of will, deliberation, and premedita-
tion on the part of the slayer; and if such is the case, the killing is
murder of the first degree, no matter how rapidly these acts of the
mind may succeed each other, or how quickly they may be followed
by the act of killing.99
The most persistent difficulty regarding the first degree/second
degree murder distinction lies here: To premeditate and deliberate
requires advance thought about the decision to kill, reflection on that
decision, consideration of alternatives-careful decisionmaking-at
least any commonly understood meaning of these words would re-
quire this. Of course, forming the "intent to kill" requires decision-
making too. Depending on the time span required to engage in
premeditation and deliberation, the distinction between a premedi-
97. Id.
98. An intentional killing done in response to adequate provocation is voluntary man-
slaughter. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (Lexis Supp. 2002). If the provocation is determined
not to be legally adequate, the killing cannot be voluntary manslaughter but rather must
be murder. Will it be second or first degree? If first degree murder requires only "clear
proof of intent to kill," then the answer should be first degree. If, however, deliberate and
premeditated are elements separate and in addition to the intent to kill, then absent proof
of those elements, the murder would be of second degree. The relationship between these
three forms of homicide was not resolved clearly until the case of People v. Heslen, 163 P.2d
21 (Cal. 1945). See discussion infra Part IV.
99. Sanchez. 24 Cal. at 30.
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tated and deliberated intent to kill and a bare intent to kill can be
described as somewhere between elusive and non-existent.
Regardless of theoretical differences between the standards
adopted in the Bealoba and Sanchez opinions, language highlighting
how fast deliberate premeditation can take place both confused the
theoretical distinction and undermined any difference in practice. If a
killer can form this more aggravated mental state in a matter of mo-
ments, how can the jury differentiate aggravated intent to kill from
non-aggravated intent to kill?' 0 0
B. 1864 to 1944: Continued Ambiguity, Confusion, and
Contradiction
For eighty years after the Sanchez decision the court did little to
alleviate the state of confusion engendered by its first two decisions.
Both in setting forth legal doctrine and in applying doctrine to facts,
the court continued to give conflicting messages. A few examples
illustrate.
Two cases decided within the first decade after Sanchez demon-
strate the confused state of the legal doctrine. In People v. Long'0 the
court said the following regarding the distinction between first and
second degree murder:
[T] here must be not only an intention to take life, but it must also
be a "deliberate and premeditated killing;" nor is it true that in
murder of the second degree there must, of necessity, be an ab-
sence of all intention to take life. On the contrary, the true distinc-
tion between the two grades of the offense is, that in murder of the
first degree, unless it was committed in perpetrating or attempting
to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery or burglary, the killing must be
deliberate and premeditated, whilst in murder of the second de-
gree the killing is not deliberate or premeditated.10 2
Here the court seemed to follow the Sanchez approach, holding that
intent to kill alone was insufficient to prove first degree murder.
100. The Bealoba decision also emphasized the rapidity with which the required mental
state could be formed. See People v. Bealoba, 17 Cal. 389, 394 (1861). However, in Bealoba
the effect was merely to underscore the fact that nothing more than a bare intent to kill
was required. In Sanchez, however, the court distinguished between a deliberate premedi-
tated intent to kill and a simple intent to kill. See generally Sanchez, 24 Cal. at 30. Emphasiz-
ing how rapidly deliberation and premeditation can occur undercut the distinction the
court had just made.
101. 39 Cal. 694 (1870).
102. Id. at 696. As in the Sanchez decision, however, the court immediately went on to
undercut the apparent clarity of the distinction by adding that such premeditated, precon-
ceived design, can be "formed in the mind immediately before the mortal wound [is]
given .... " Id.
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People v. Doyell,10 3 decided only four years after Long, appeared to
reverse direction again when the opinion said the following regarding
the statute which divided murder into degrees: "[I] t prescribes a more
severe punishment for those murders in which the express intent to
take life is affirmatively proved, than for those in which the express
malice not being proved, the malice aforethought is implied."1 0 4
The court further explored the definition of implied malice and
noted that second degree murder existed "unless the facts prove the
existence in the mind of the slayer of the specific intent to take
life." 10 5 Regarding the language from Long quoted above, the court
stated:
If it is there (in Long] intimated that in murder of the second de-
gree there may be an intention to take life, this is to be considered
as referring to the intent which the law imputes by reason of the
corrupt motive of the slayer, or otherwise, and not to an actual
preconceived design to kill.10 6
So in Doyell the court seemed to abandon the Sanchez position and
return to the approach of Bealoba.
The opinion in People v. Manzo'0 7 illustrates that the passage of an
additional sixty years failed to bring additional clarity. There the trial
court had instructed the jury as follows:
The unlawful killing must be accomplished with a deliberate and
clear intent to take life in order to constitute murder in the first
degree. The intent to kill must be the result of deliberate premedi-
tation. It must be formed upon a pre-existing reflection and not
upon a sudden heat of passion sufficient to preclude the idea of
deliberation.10 8
This portion of the instruction emphasized deliberation and pre-ex-
isting reflection, suggesting that first degree murder required more
than a simple intent to kill.
The instruction continued:
If the unlawful killing is done without the provocation and sudden
passion which reduces the offense to manslaughter .... this is mur-
der of the second degree, unless the evidence proves the existence
in the mind of the slayer of the specific intent to take life. If such
specific intent exists at the time of such unlawful killing the offense
committed would of course, be murder of the first degree.' 0 9
103. 48 Cal. 85 (1874).
104. Id. at 96.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 9 Cal. 2d 594 (1937).
108. Id. at 599.
109. Id.
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This part of the instruction addressed the role of provocation, but
apparently did not explain that the offense would be reduced to man-
slaughter only if the provocation was legally adequate and also did not
address the consequences of provocation that was legally inadequate.
The instruction seemed to suggest that provocation could result in a
conviction of second degree murder (i.e., suggested an intentional
but non-premeditated and deliberated murder was possible). How-
ever, the last sentence, stating that a "specific intent to take
life ... would, of course, be murder of the first degree,"110 appears to
be inconsistent with the possibility of a second degree murder verdict,
since even a killing in response to provocation, whether or not legally
adequate, is likely to be done with the intent to kill. The court in
Manzo found no error in this instruction.111
Cases challenging the sufficiency of the evidence similarly failed
to clarify the distinction between intention on the one hand and pre-
meditation and deliberation on the other. In case after case, the court
affirmed first degree murder convictions based on facts that demon-
strated nothing beyond the intent to kill.112 In fact, for seventy-one
110. Id. at 599-600.
111. See id. at 600.
112. Convictions of first degree murder were affirmed regularly where evidence sug-
gested an essentially spontaneous decision to kill. Facts in the following cases illustrate.
In People v. Mahatch, 82 P. 779 (Cal. 1905) defendant and the victim spent much of the
day drinking together and apparently got into a fight. Defendant went to a nearby resi-
dence and told the occupant he "had had a row with [the victim]." Id. at 779. In response
to a question about a mark on his face, defendant said the victim hit him. See id. The cause
of death was determined to be a stab wound to the heart, and a knife identified as previ-
ously having been in defendant's possession was found in the general vicinity of the body.
See id. at 780. In response to defendant's argument that there was no evidence of a deliber-
ate and premeditated killing, the court simply responded that the jury was entitled to infer
premeditation and deliberation, "from the character of the weapon used, the nature of the
wound inflicted, and the acts and conduct of the accused, [and] the existence of a deliber-
ate purpose on his part to kill the deceased . . . ." Id. The court made no attempt to
connect these observations to the facts of the case. See id. at 781. The dissenting opinion
argued that these facts were insufficient even to establish express malice. See id.
In People v. Fleming, 23 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1933), the murder took place at a combined gas
station and roadhouse, where a friend of defendant's worked as a prostitute. The friend
approached the victim, a customer at the gas station, and asked him to buy her a drink. See
id. at 29. The victim declined and made derogatory comments to the friend. See id. Defen-
dant demanded that the victim apologize. See id. The victim refused and pushed defendant
out of his way, in the process pushing defendant through the door. See id. The victim also
proceeded through the door and shots were heard immediately thereafter. See id. The
court found that proof of malice was established based on defendant's resentment of the
victim for his statements to his friend and based on the fact that no justification existed for
defendant's use of force. See id. at 31. In response to defendant's further argument that,
even if malice was established, no proof existed of premeditation and deliberation, the
court responded simply that no significant amount of time was needed to premeditate and
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years after murder was divided into degrees, the court did not reverse
a single first degree murder conviction based on insufficiency of the
evidence. In 1927 the legislature enacted Penal Code section 1181,113
a statute that allowed the court to modify ajudgment, without order-
ing a new trial, if the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convic-
tion of the degree of the crime charged but was sufficient to establish
guilt of a lesser degree. After this the court reduced the degree of the
homicide from first to second degree in two cases; 1 4 the reason the
court chose to reduce these two convictions was unclear. In each case
there was evidence that the killing may have occurred during the
course of a spontaneous argument, although there was also evidence
to the contrary. Even if the killings did occur spontaneously, this fact
did not materially distinguish these two cases from others in which
convictions were affirmed.' 15
The decision in People v. Donnelly1 16 provides a final example from
this period of the court's resistance to making any real distinction be-
tween the degrees of murder. Donnelly was convicted of first degree
murder and sentenced to death based on a killing that took place in
the state prison at Folsom. The facts suggested that defendant's deadly
act followed immediately after the statement that precipitated the kill-
ing. The jury was apparently instructed in the "no appreciable space
deliberate. See id. at 31-32. The court applied this observation to the facts in the following
manner:
[W]hile the testimony... shows that the defendant shot almost, if not immedi-
ately, after the two men went through the door, still there was time for the defen-
dant to think before he acted, to deliberate between the intention to kill and the
act of killing. Defendant had time to draw his gun and fire the shots. He formed
the intention to draw his gun, and then acted upon that intention .... He thus
had time to think and to act. This is all that is necessary in order to show
premeditation.
Id. at 32. These comments suggest either that the court still adhered to the Bealoba position
that any intentional killing is first degree murder, or that it made no meaningful distinc-
tion between the intent to kill of express malice and the premeditated and deliberated
intent to kill of first degree murder.
The facts of many cases from this era cannot be evaluated meaningfully. Opinions
consisting of one or two pages affirmed convictions of first degree murder and the imposi-
tion of the death penalty with virtually no reference to the facts of the case. See, e.g., People
v. Rico, 181 P. 663 (Cal. 1919); People v. Hart, 64 P.2d 952 (Cal. 1937); People v. Aranda,
83 P.2d 928 (Cal. 1938); People v. Shaw, 146 P.2d 231 (Cal. 1944).
113. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1181 (West 1985).
114. See People v. Howard, 295 P. 333 (Cal. 1930); People v. Moreno, 58 P.2d 629 (Cal.
1936).
115. See supra note 112.
116. 210 P. 523 (Cal. 1922).
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of time" language of Sanchez. Defendant requested the following addi-
tional instruction:
But while the fatal purpose or intent and its execution may follow
thus rapidly upon each other, it is proper for you to take into con-
sideration the shortness of such interval, if such be the fact, in con-
sidering whether such sudden and speedy execution may not be
attributed to sudden passion and anger, rather than to the deliber-
ation and premeditation, which must characterize the higher
offense. 117
This proposed instruction accepted the premise that premeditation
and deliberation could occur in a short amount of time, but would
have told the jury that the fact of such a brief time period might be
relevant to whether he actually premeditated and deliberated. The
trial court refused this instruction and the supreme court found no
error in that refusal.]18
In 1936, an article by James Pike was published in the Southern
California Law Review entitled What Is Second Degree Murder in Califor-
nia ?119 The article asked what was the nature of an "intentional homi-
cide without deliberation?" Stated differently, the question was "what
is a premeditated and deliberated murder and how does it differ from
a murder that is only intentional?" This, of course, is the question at
the heart of the degree-fixing statute-has the statute drawn a worka-
ble line between first and second degree murder? The article con-
cluded that, both from a psychological and legal viewpoint, an
intentional undeliberated murder could not exist; or, in other words,
any intentional homicide inevitably involved deliberation.120 At least
as applied by the court up to that point, the distinction between first
and second degree murder was illusory. Shortly thereafter, the court
began the task of making the distinction real.
IV. An Era of Judicial Clarification-1944 to 1980
Pike's article may well have been a triggering event. Within a few
years, the court's opinions changed markedly. Both in regard to legal
doctrine and application of doctrine to facts, the court consistently
emphasized the need to draw a clear distinction between the two de-
117. Id. (citations omitted).
118. See id. at 524.
119. See Pike, supra note 10, at 112.
120. Pike's analysis of cases that resulted in second degree murder verdicts led him to
conclude that in virtually every case sufficient facts existed to support a verdict of first
degree murder, but that the second degree murder verdict stemmed from some mitigating
facts or doubt about the accused's guilt of any homicide. See id. at 128-32.
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grees of murder. The decision in People v. Holt12' signaled the begin-
ning of this era. There, in the course of reducing the defendant's
conviction to second degree murder, the court clearly articulated an
interpretation of section 189 that required proof of more than a bare
intent to kill. In a series of decisions that reversed first degree murder
convictions based on instructional error, the court re-emphasized this
position. 122 To this point, the court had examined premeditation and
deliberation primarily as a quantitative question. In People v. Wolff 23
the court addressed the qualitative nature of premeditation and delib-
eration. In the last major case of this era, People v. Anderson,124 the
court set out guidelines for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
of premeditation and deliberation.
A. People v. Holt The Beginning of a New Era
After decades of applying section 189 with little regard for how
the statute figured into the larger homicide scheme, the court, in Holt,
relied heavily on contextual analysis. In a seminal statement the court
observed that
[d]ividing ... homicides into murder and.., manslaughter was a
recognition of the infirmity of human nature. Again dividing the
offense of murder into two degrees is a further recognition of that
infirmity and of difference in the quantum of personal turpitude of
the offenders. The difference is basically in the offenders but is to
be measured by the character of the particular homicide. The vic-
tim of manslaughter or second degree murder is just as dead as is
the victim of first degree murder.' 25
In this passage, the court emphasized the essential structure of mod-
ern homicide law-stratification based on the relative culpability of
the killer. Given this structure, first degree murder obviously must re-
flect markedly greater blameworthiness than other forms of homicide,
particularly greater than that of second degree murder.
The court then turned to the structure of section 189 and the
place of premeditation and deliberation within that statute. Referring
back to Sanchez, the court observed that section 189 positively identi-
fied two classes of first degree murder-one class identified by the
means used (poison, lying in wait, torture) and the second identified
by the felony in which the perpetration (or attempted perpetration)
121. 153 P.2d 21 (Cal. 1944).
122. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
123. 394 P.2d 959 (Cal. 1964).
124. 447 P.2d 942 (Cal. 1968).
125. Holt, 153 P.2d at 37.
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of the homicide occurred. The court then quoted directly from
Sanchez and said,
but there is another and much larger class of cases included in the
definition of murder in the first degree, which are of equal cruelty and
aggravation with those enumerated, and which, owing to the different
and countless forms which murder assumes, it is impossible to de-
scribe [enumerate] in the statute. In this class the Legislature
leaves to the jury to determine, from all the evidence before them,
the degree of the crime, but prescribes, for the government of their delib-
erations, the same test which has been used by itself in determining the
degree of the other two classes-to wit: the deliberate and preconceived
intent to kill. Thus the three classes of cases which constitute mur-
der of the first degree are made to stand upon the same
principle. 12 6
Based on this contextual analysis, the court concluded that pre-
meditation and deliberation were intended to be elements distinct
from the intent to kill. In the words of the court, "the verdict of guilty
of murder of the first degree depends upon proof not only of a mali-
cious intent unlawfully to take life but also that such malicious intent
was willful, deliberate, and premeditated."127 Even more explicitly, the
court stated "the phrase 'malicious intent' is not synonymous with
'willful, deliberate, and premeditated' intent. '" 128 Relying heavily on
Pike's article, 29 the court criticized earlier decisions for their "lack of
clarity and consistency" and for having "substantially emasculate[d]
the difference between murder of the first degree and that of the sec-
ond degree.' 1 3 0 The court concluded that, to be sufficient to establish
first degree murder, the evidence must show that the killing was done
with a "deliberate and clear intent to take life"'' 1 and that "the homi-
cide is of equal cruelty and aggravation with those enumerated in the
statute .... "132
The court then turned to the facts and began by observing that at
first impression the evidence of premeditation and deliberation
seemed sufficient. On the day of the murder, defendant, a railroad
telegraph operator, was drinking heavily and picked a series of unpro-
voked disputes with other employees of the railroad, including the
victim. At one point, several hours in advance of the killing, the defen-
dant threatened to go home, get his gun, "and shoot [the victim's]
126. Id. at 38 (quoting People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17, 28-30 (1864)).
127. Id. at 27.
128. Id.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
130. Holt, 153 P.2d at 36.
131. Id. at 38 (citing People v. Howard, 295 P. 333, 336 (Cal. 1930)).
132. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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God damn heart out and wipe it across his mouth."'133 This remark,
coupled with the fact that defendant later got his gun and shot the
victim, suggested premeditation and deliberation regarding the possi-
bility of deadly action.' 34
However, the court found this analysis too superficial and de-
scribed the critical facts of the final deadly encounter as follows:
[The record] .. .establishes that the deceased was advancing to-
ward the defendant; that the latter at close range fired one shot
apparently not aimed at and which did not strike the deceased;
that defendant then shouted a further warning, "Stay back, don't
come any closer, or I will kill you;" that after the first shot was fired
the deceased continued to advance although he apparently was in
the act of stopping or turning at the precise moment the second
shot was fired; that the second shot was fired and that the bullet, of
small calibre, struck the deceased; that the deceased then stopped,
turned, and walked around the train and to the station; that defen-
dant with eight loaded cartridges remaining in his rifle stopped firing when
the deceased stopped advancing and that he then permitted the deceased to
proceed to the station without further molestation. 1 3 5
Noting the uncontested fact that defendant fired no additional
shots once the victim stopped coming toward defendant, the court
concluded that the circumstances of the shooting were overwhelm-
ingly inconsistent "with a deliberate and clear intent to take life."136
The court further found that the circumstances of the murder gener-
ally did not establish a homicide of "'equal cruelty and aggravation
with those enumerated' in the statute,"'137 and accordingly, reduced
Holt's conviction to second degree murder.' 3 8
This analysis seems correct insofar as the court concluded that
the facts of the encounter did not convincingly establish premedita-
tion and deliberation. However, Holt's failure to fire additional shots
at the victim, specifically relied upon by the court, suggests not only
that Holt did not deliberate and premeditate on killing the deceased,
but further that he may not have intended to kill. If that were true, the
case could be no more than second degree based on implied malice.
In that sense, the Holt case did not provide a clear example of an
intentional murder committed without premeditation and
deliberation.
133. Id. at 27.
134. See id. Certainly these facts are more suggestive of prior planning and deliberation
than the facts of many cases confronting the court in more recent years. See infra Part V.
135. Id. at 38.
136. Id. at 39.
137. Id.
138. See id.
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Despite this limitation, the decision in Holt was important for sev-
eral reasons. First, after years of inconsistency, the court held unam-
biguously that premeditation and deliberation were distinct elements
from the intent to kill. Second, the court construed the statute within
the broader context of the constituent parts of section 189, and also
the structure of relative culpability of the homicide scheme as a whole.
Third, the decision demonstrated the court's willingness to engage in
a meaningful review of the facts, in contrast to the pro forma review
characteristic of the vast majority of previous cases.
B. The Jury Instructions
Given eighty years of "substantial inconsistencies and obfuscation
of concept as to the elements of the two degrees of murder,"139 the
fact that jury instructions of the time generally did not measure up to
the standard articulated in the Holt decision came as no great sur-
prise. This was the next arena for the court, and it addressed jury in-
structions related to three topics: (1) the need to distinguish between
intent to kill and premeditation and deliberation; (2) the persistently
troubling "timing element"; and (3) the relationship of provocation to
the degree of murder.
People v. Thomas140 was the first case in the wake of the Holt deci-
sion to consider the propriety of instructions regarding the distinction
between intent to kill and premeditation and deliberation. In lan-
guage taken from the Bealoba decision, the trial court instructed the
jury that premeditation and deliberation was established by proof of a
specific intent to kill. 141 The state argued that the instruction was
proper because "specific intent" referred to in the instruction was sy-
nonymous with the "deliberate intent" referred to in the Holt decision.
139. People v. Thomas, 156 P.2d 7, 10 (Cal. 1945).
140. Id.
141. The instruction stated:
If the unlawful killing is done without the provocation and sudden passion which
reduces the offense to manslaughter, or is done in the commission of an unlawful
act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, or is committed in
the attempt to perpetrate a felony other than those mentioned in the description
of murder in the first degree, or the circumstances of the killing show an aban-
doned heart, this is murder of the second degree, unless the evidence proves the
existence in the mind of the slayer of the specific intent to take life. If such specific intent
exists at the time of such unlawful killing, the offense committed would of course be murder
of the first degree.
Id. at 14. See also People v. Valentine, 169 P.2d I (Cal. 1946) (reversing a first degree mur-
der conviction in part because the jury was given a similar instruction that allowed convic-
tion of first degree murder based solely on proof of a specific intent to kill).
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The court rejected this argument on the grounds it ignored the differ-
ence in the plain meaning of the words "specific" and "deliberate,
' 142
and omitted any consideration of the further statutory requirement of
premeditation. 143 The court described the instruction as "egregiously
erroneous,"1 44 and emphasized that, by conjoining the words "willful,
deliberate, and premeditated," the legislature intended to require
substantially more reflection than is involved in forming a specific in-
tent to kill. 145
The second topic of concern, the time required for premedita-
tion and deliberation, had been a recurrent problem from the begin-
ning. Instructions emphasizing the speed with which that
premeditation and deliberation could occur obscured the dividing
line between the two degrees of murder.1 46 If, as these instructions
stated, premeditation and deliberation could occur "as instantane-
ous [ly] as successive thoughts of the mind,"147 how could a killing that
involved only the intent to kill be distinguished from one which also
was premeditated and deliberated?
The court addressed this dilemma in People v. Bender.148 In lan-
guage taken directly from Sanchez, the jury had been told that there
142. In the words of the court,
To support it would belie any difference in the plain import of the words "spe-
cific" and "deliberate" and would emasculate the statutory difference between
first and second degree murder. The word "specific" (adjective) means "Precisely
formulated or restricted; ... definite,... explicit; of an exact or particular na-
ture" . . . while "deliberate" (as an adjective) means "formed, arrived at, or deter-
mined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations; as, a
deliberate judgment or plan; carried on coolly and steadily, esp. according to a
preconceived design; .... Given to weighing facts and arguments with a view to a
choice or decision; careful in considering the consequences of a step; ... Slow in
action; unhurried .... Characterized by reflection; dispassionate; not rash .... "
The verb "deliberate" means "to weigh in the mind; to consider the reasons for
and against; to consider maturely; reflect upon; ponder; as, to deliberate a ques-
tion.., to weigh the arguments for and against a proposed course of action .... "
It has been judicially declared that "Deliberation means careful consideration
and examination of the reasons for and against a choice or measure."
Thomas, 156 P.2d at 17 (citations omitted).
143. See id. (defining premeditation according to its dictionary usage as "to think on,
and revolve in the mind, beforehand; to contrive and design previously.").
144. Id.
145. See id. at 18. Because there was a substantial factual dispute regarding whether the
killing, in fact, was the result of planning and reflection or instead the product of hot
anger, the court reversed defendant's first degree murder conviction and remanded for a
new trial. See id. at 20.
146. As discussed above, such instructions found their roots in both the Bealoba and
Sanchez decisions. See discussion supra Part III.A.
147. People v. Bender, 163 P.2d 8, 19 (Cal. 1945) (quoting the jury instructions).
148. Id.
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need be "no appreciable space of time between the intention to kill
and the act of killing-they may be as instantaneous as successive
thoughts of the mind." 149 The court observed that, in the abstract, this
instruction correctly stated the law-assuming a killer premeditated
and deliberated in advance of his final decision to kill, no additional
time would be required for contemplation between forming the in-
tent and acting on that intent. However, the instruction went on to say
that "[a] man may do a thing willfully, deliberately and intentionally
from a moment's reflection as well as after pondering over the subject
for a month or a year," and "[h]e can premeditate, that is, think
before doing the act, the moment he conceives the purpose, as well as
if the act were the result of long preconcert or preparation."1 5 0 The
first part of the instruction theoretically left open the possibility that
premeditation and deliberation occurred prior to the formation of
the intent to kill. The latter two parts, however, told the jury that any
such prior premeditation and deliberation could occur instantane-
ously. In the words of the Bender court, this instruction "wholly deleted
the only difference, in this type of case, between first and second de-
gree murder.' 1 5 1
People v. Honeycutt'52 involved a challenge to the same instruction.
The court in Honeycutt again described the first part as abstractly cor-
rect, but also noted it was likely to be misleading. The court's charac-
terization of the last two sentences of the instruction was both
negative and blunt, finding them to be "clearly erroneous." The court
said, "[i]t is misleading to encourage a jury to find that an act is truly
deliberate though it come [sic] instantaneously from but 'a moments
reflection . . .' [a]nd it shames the law as it violates the truth to say
that a man can premeditate the moment he conceives the
purpose."' 53
In Bender the state argued that the legislature had indicated no
intent to require a certain amount of time for premeditation and de-
liberation. 154 The court agreed and noted that appropriate instruc-
149. Id. at 19.
150. Id. Similar instructions were considered in People v. Heslen, 163 P.2d 21 (Cal.
1945); People v. Valentine, 169 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1946); People v. Honeycutt, 172 P.2d 698 (Cal.
1946); People v. Hilton, 174 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1946); People v. Carmen, 228 P.2d 281 (Cal. 1951);
People v. Chavez, 234 P.2d 632 (Cal. 1951).
151. Bender, 163 P.2d at 20 (finding such instructions particularly problematic where,
as in this case, the jury was not instructed regarding the definition of premeditation and
deliberation). See also People v. Heslen, 163 P.2d 21 (Cal. 1945).
152. 172 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1946).
153. Id. at 702-03.
154. See Bender, 163 P.2d at 19.
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tions could be drafted to reflect this. 1 5 However, it also noted that
there was no indication that the legislature intended to use the words
"deliberate" and "premeditate" in anything other than their ordinary
sense, 156 and that in order to counterbalance the suggestion that such
mental processes could occur rapidly, the jury should be instructed
regarding the true meaning of those words. 15 7 The court suggested
the following definitions:
The adjective "deliberate" means "formed, arrived at, or deter-
mined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of consid-
erations; as a deliberate judgment or plan; carried on coolly and
steadily, especially according to a preconceived design .... Given
to weighing facts and arguments with a view to a choice or deci-
sion; careful in considering the consequences of choice or deci-
sion; careful in considering the consequences of a step; . . .
unhurried; .... Characterized by reflection; dispassionate; not
rash ... ." The word is an antonym of "[h]asty, impetuous, rash,
impulsive." It hag been judicially declared that "Deliberation means
careful consideration and examination of the reasons for and
against a choice or measure." The verb "premeditate" means "[t] o
think on, and revolve in the mind, beforehand; to contrive and
design previously."1 58
Thereafter, the court held that it was error to refuse to instruct the
jury regarding the definitions of premeditation and deliberation, par-
ticularly where any instruction was given suggesting that these ele-
ments could be arrived at rapidly.159
Once the court stated unambiguously that the elements of pre-
meditation and deliberation were distinct from the intent to kill, un-
derlying questions regarding the relationship of provocation to the
degrees of murder became apparent. Provocation had long played an
155. In this regard the court said the following:
For example, the jury may be told that "Neither the statute nor the court under-
takes to measure in units of time the length of the period during which the
thought must be pondered before it can ripen into an intent which is truly delib-
erate and premeditated. The time would vary with different individuals and
under differing circumstances. The true test is not the duration of time as much
as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great
rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly, but the express
requirement for a concurrence of deliberation and premeditation excludes from
murder of the first degree those homicides (not specifically enumerated in the
statute) which are the result of mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily
executed."
Id. at 20 (quoting People v. Thomas, 156 P.2d 7, 18 (Cal. 1945)).
156. See Bender, 163 P.2d at 19.
157. See id. at 20.
158. Id. at 19 (citations omitted).
159. See People v. Carmen, 228 P.2d 281, 287 (Cal. 1951).
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important role in the larger homicide scheme by distinguishing be-
tween murder and manslaughter. 60 Whether provocation also played
a role in determining the degree of murder was less clear. The prob-
lem arose when a defendant was in a "heat of passion," but the trigger-
ing provocation was not legally adequate. In these circumstances, the
defendant could not successfully argue for a manslaughter convic-
tion.' 61 Could he nonetheless argue that he should be convicted only
of second degree murder? As long as premeditation and deliberation
were, in essence, synonymous with intent to kill, the answer was no,
since despite (or perhaps more accurately, because of) the heat of
passion, the offender generally did intend to kill. However, such an
enraged intent to kill could not meet the Holt/Bender standards of cool
weighing of alternatives. Hence, in a number of cases, the court held
that failure to instruct the jury regarding the potential effect of provo-
cation on the existence of premeditation and deliberation was
error. 16 2
To summarize, in Holt and the jury instruction cases, the court
resolved that premeditation and deliberation were elements to be
proved in addition to the intent to kill. This holding, in turn, con-
firmed the existence of intentional second degree murder. The court
reaffirmed that premeditation and deliberation do not require any set
amount of time, but also affirmed that the state must produce evi-
dence of real forethought and reflection to establish these elements,
and that if, for whatever reason, including provocation, the accused
did not actually engage in such forethought and reflection, he could
not be convicted of a crime greater than second degree murder. 63
C. A Qualitative Aspect to Premeditation and Deliberation
The decisions in Holt and the other cases were premised on the
role of first degree murder within the overall structure of the homi-
cide scheme and were designed to assure that first degree murders
were meaningfully different than those of the second degree. Yet a
sense remained that the existence of premeditation and delibera-
tion-that is, of forethought and consideration of alternatives-was
160. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (Deering 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (Lexis Supp.
2002).
161. Provocation must be sufficient that a reasonable person would be in a heat of
passion. See People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976).
162. See People v. Thomas, 156 P.2d 7 (Cal. 1945); People v. Valentine, 169 P.2d 1 (Cal.
1946). See also People v. Heslen, 163 P.2d 21 (Cal. 1945).
163. Unless some other theory is established-for example, felony murder or atrocious
means.
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not in all cases necessarily correlated with a high level of moral turpi-
tude. Particularly in cases that involved mental disease or defect, im-
maturity, intoxication, or a combination of these factors,
premeditation and deliberation seemed often to be a matter of "going
through the motions," with no real connection to culpability. In
Wolff 6 4 the court addressed this qualitative aspect of premeditation
and deliberation.
The groundwork for the Wolff decision was laid in a series of cases
that gradually transformed the rules regarding proof of mental state
in the California homicide scheme. These decisions established what
became known as the Wells-Gorshen Rule 165 and appear, in large
part, to have been generated by concern about the relationship of
mental disability to culpability. Prior to the development of these
cases evidence of mental disease was strictly limited to the issue of
sanity and explicitly prohibited in the guilt phase of the trial.1 66 The
Wells-Gorshen Rule removed the barrier between mental state and
mental disease, allowing the introduction of psychiatric evidence at
the guilt phase to prove the absence of critical mental states.
Most of the cases applying Wells-Gorshen involved the element of
malice aforethought. 167 Because the definition of malice has been
profoundly elusive, identifying the relationship between the evidence
of mental disability and/or intoxication to its presence or absence was
not an easy task.168 At least superficially, application of the Wells-Gor-
shen Rule to the elements of premeditation and deliberation was sim-
pler. The words themselves were common and familiar. Further, when
the court attempted to define these elements more precisely, it turned
to dictionary definitions. 169 Hence the technical legal meaning and
the common understanding of these words coincided, and juries were
told that they must find that the accused thought about the decision
164. People v. Wolff, 394 P.2d 959 (Cal. 1964).
165. The Wells-Gorshen Rule derived its name from the first two of the series of cases
establishing this doctrine. See People v. Gorshen, 336 P.2d 492 (Cal. 1959); People v. Wells,
202 P.2d 53 (Cal. 1949). See also People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342 (Cal. 1979); People v.
Cantrell, 504 P.2d 1256 (Cal. 1973); People v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1966); People v.
Wolff, 394 P.2d 959 (Cal. 1964); People v. Henderson, 386 P.2d 677 (Cal. 1963).
166. This strict segregation was a product of a 1927 amendment to the Penal Code
which established a bifurcated trial system. The issue of sanity was tried at a separate pro-
ceeding following a determination of guilt; all evidence of mental disease or disorder was
relegated to the hearing on the determination sanity. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (Lexis
1998) (as added in 1927).
167. See supra note 165.
168. See Mounts, supra note 27, at 337-51.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 156-59.
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to kill beforehand, that the decision to kill resulted from careful
thought and weighing of considerations, that it was characterized by
reflection and dispassion, and was not hasty, impetuous, or rash. 17
0
Thus, the issue should have been a simple one of identifying the kinds
of evidence that were inconsistent with such cool, deliberate planning.
However, if examined from the perspective of the purpose be-
hind the division of murder into degrees-identifying the most culpa-
ble forms of murder so as to limit the reach of the death penalty-the
issue becomes more complicated. As defined, these particular ele-
ments focus heavily on cognition. The notion that cognitive abilities
necessarily correlate with culpability increasingly was questioned
based on the recognition that mental illness can often leave cognitive
abilities unaffected, while seriously undermining emotional and voli-
tional capacities. 171
The decision in Wolff attempted to integrate the legislative pur-
pose of identifying full moral culpability with evolving understanding
of mental disease and defect in the context of premeditation and de-
liberation. The defendant, a fifteen year old boy, was charged with the
murder of his mother. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity. Four psychiatrists testified without contradiction
that defendant suffered from schizophrenia.1 72 The evidence indi-
cated that, in the year prior to the killing, the defendant spent a lot of
time thinking about sex, that he decided his mother was an obstacle
to carrying out his rather bizarre plans to have sex with various girls in
the community, and accordingly planned and executed her killing.
170. See People v. Bender, 163 P.2d 8, 19 (Cal. 1945).
171. Psychological theory of the time increasingly rejected the idea that cognition
could be separated from other mental capacities and instead saw the individual as a com-
plex whole whose mental disease might have a variety of effects, including impairment of
cognition, emotional awareness, and volitional control. See, e.g., MANFRED S. GuT-rMACHER
& HENRY WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 409 (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1952) [herein-
after GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN]; Bernard L. Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally
Ill, 14 STAN. L. REV. 59 (1961); Gerhard 0. W. Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN.
L. REV. 1043 (1958); Winfred Overholser, The Place of Psychiatry in the Criminal Law, 16 B.U.
L. REv. 322 (1936); Henry Weihofen & Winfred Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting the
Degree of Crime, 56 YALE L. REv. 959 (1947). Guttmacher and Weihofen described the law as
being influenced by
an outworn conception of man's mental processes, a concentration of attention
upon intellectual power to comprehend the nature of the transaction involved,
and a failure to appreciate the importance of temperament, the driving force of
the emotions, the development and strength of inhibitions and the soundness of
the central nervous system in determining how the human organism reacts to
situations.
GuT-rMACHER & WEIHOFEN, supra, at 323.
172. See People v. Wolff, 394 P.2d 959, 964 (1964).
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The court found the evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict
of sanity, and on the surface the evidence also established that defen-
dant planned and deliberated his mother's killing.173 Nonetheless,
the court reduced the judgment from first to second degree mur-
der.174 As it had in Holt and Thomas, the court emphasized the impor-
tance of assessing individual culpability within the overall
proportionality required by the homicide structure, 175 including the
need to ensure that a "willful, deliberate, and premeditated" murder
was of the same cruelty and aggravation as the more specific forms of
first degree murder set out in section 189.176
The California Supreme Court opinion reflected concern not just
with the defendant's ability to go through the motions involved in pre-
meditation and deliberation, but also with the extent of his under-
standing of his contemplated actions. Referring to the defendant's
youth and mental impairment, the court observed that "the extent of
his understanding, reflection upon it and its consequences, with reali-
zation of the enormity of the evil, appears to have been materially-as
relevant to appraising the quantum of his moral turpitude and deprav-
ity-vague and detached,"'177 and emphasized'"the somewhat limited
extent to which this defendant could maturely and meaningfully re-
flect upon the gravity of his contemplated act."' 178 The true test of
173. See id. Several days before the crime, the defendant obtained from the garage an
axe handle which he then hid under his mattress. See id. at 966. The evening before the
crime he took the axe handle from under his mattress, approached his mother from be-
hind, and raised the weapon to strike her. Sensing his presence behind her, his mother
asked what he was doing. See id. He said "nothing," and returned the axe handle to its place
under his mattress. The next morning he again approached his mother from behind with
the axe handle, and this time hit her on the back of her head. See id. They struggled in the
kitchen; defendant attempted to strangle her. She broke away from him and ran into the
front room where he pursued her and eventually strangled her to death with his hands. See
id. Shortly thereafter, the defendant walked to the police station to turn himself in, saying
"I just killed my mother with an axe handle." Id. at 966.
174. See id. at 976.
175. The court said, "[d]ividi n g intentional homicides into murder and voluntary man-
slaughter was a recognition of the infirmity of human nature. Again, dividing the offense of
murder into two degrees is a further recognition of that infirmity and of difference in the quantum of
personal turpitude of the offenders . Id. at 974.
176. See id. at 975.
177. Id. at 976.
178. Id. at 975. See also discussion infra Part V (discussing the later legislative "repeal" of
this aspect of the Wolff decision). The reference to the ability to "maturely and meaning-
fully reflect" came to be associated strongly with the Wolff decision as a sort ofjudicial gloss
on the statutory elements of premeditation and deliberation. However, in fact, this lan-
guage seems to derive from the definition of "deliberate" provided in WEBSTER'S NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed.) cited as early as People v. Thomas, 156 P.2d 7 (Cal. 1945),
decided almost twenty years before Wolff That definition included "to weigh in the mind;
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premeditation and deliberation, according to the court, was not the
duration of time as much as the extent of the reflection.
The defense bar quickly recognized the potential presented by
the Wolff decision, and over the next several years, the court con-
fronted a number of challenges under the new standard to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence of premeditation and deliberation.1 79 The
opinions in each of these cases recited facts that strongly suggested a
planned killing, in some a meticulously planned killing. Each also de-
scribed a killer whose significant mental and emotional disturbances,
often the product of a horrendous personal history, affected the plan-
ning in some significant respect. The court rejected the challenges
and affirmed a first degree murder conviction in some cases, 180 and in
others it reduced the conviction to second degree murder. 181 This
might suggest that the court was having at least some success in distin-
guishing those cases where the forethought and planning truly indi-
cated culpability from those that did not.
Another aspect of these cases, however, raised serious questions.
In Wolff all four experts agreed the defendant was schizophrenic. 182
Such agreement may have derived from the fact that nothing hinged
on it. Wolff s schizophrenia was not inconsistent with being found
sane under the M'Naghten standard, 183 nor, prior to the decision in
his case, was it inconsistent with premeditation and deliberation. After
Wolff such agreement was rare, and decisions soon were filled with
descriptions of the opinions of competing experts; in one case as
to consider the reasons for and against; to consider maturely; reflect upon ... " Id. at 17. In
Thomas, in the context of a discussion of the jury instruction advising that no appreciable
time was required to deliberate and premeditate, the court observed that "[thejury instruc-
tion] is only a declaration that the act of killing may instantaneously follow the intention
once the latter is finally formulated. It does not imply that mature reflection (deliberation
and premeditation) need not precede the ultimate formation of the evil intention." Id. at
18 (emphasis added).
179. See People v. Nicolaus, 423 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1967); People v. Goedecke, 423 P.2d 777
(Cal. 1967); People v. Risenhoover, 447 P.2d 925 (Cal. 1968); People v. Bassett, 443 P.2d
777 (Cal. 1968); People v. Cruz, 605 P.2d 830 (Cal. 1980). See also People v. Ford, 416 P.2d
132 (Cal. 1966).
180. See Risenhoover, 447 P.2d at 925; Cruz, 605 P.2d at 830.
181. See Nicolaus, 423 P.2d at 787; Goedecke, 423 P.2d at 777; Bassett, 443 P.2d at 777.
182. See Wolff 394 P.2d at 964.
183. Under the M'Naughten test of insanity, an accused could be found legally insane
if, at the time of committing the act, he was "laboring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he
did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." M'Naughten Case, 10
Clark & Fin. 200, 210 (8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722) (1843). California had followed this test of
insanity since 1864. See People v. Coffman, 24 Cal. 230 (1864).
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many as ten experts were called by the defense and prosecution.
184
The specter of resolving this fundamental question of culpability
through dueling experts was troubling.
How this might have been sorted out in the long run we will
never know. In the early 1980s, the California legislature and the elec-
torate took action in a manner that fundamentally altered the neces-
sary proof of the mental elements of murder, including premeditation
and deliberation. 18
5
D. Assessing Evidence of Premeditation and Deliberation: People v.
Anderson
Before addressing those changes, another seminal case, People v.
Anderson,18 6 must be considered. This case laid out guidelines for as-
sessing the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and delibera-
tion separate from issues of mental deficiency and is one of the most
renowned opinions issued by the California Supreme Court.
Even with the guidance of improved instructions, the task of de-
termining whether the evidence proved the existence of premedita-
tion and deliberation or only the intent to kill continued to be a
challenge for the courts. The following instruction, crafted in re-
sponse to the Thomas decision, 187 captures the fundamental problem:
The law does not undertake to measure in units of time the length
of the period during which the thought must be pondered before
it can ripen into an intent to kill which is truly deliberate and pre-
meditated. The time will vary with different individuals and under
varying circumstances. The true test is not the duration of time,
but rather the extent of the reflection. A cold, calculated judgment
and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time, but a
mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it include[s] an
intent to kill, is not such deliberation and premeditation as will fix
an unlawful killing as murder of the first degree. To constitute a
deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and
consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against
such a choice and, having in mind the consequences, decide to
and commit the unlawful act causing death. 18 8
This instruction is a substantial improvement over earlier instructions.
By its reference to a "cold, calculated judgment" and the "weigh [ing]
and consider[ing of] the question of killing and the reasons for and
184. See Risenhoover, 447 P.2d at 929-31. See also Nicolaus, 423 P.2d at 787 (five experts);
Goedecke, 423 P.2d at 777 (four experts); Bassett, 443 P.2d at 777 (six experts).
185. See discussion infra Part V. See also, Mounts, supra note 27, at 352-59.
186. 447 P.2d 942 (Cal. 1968).
187. See People v. Thomas, 156 P.2d 7 (Cal. 1945).
188. People v. Carmen, 228 P.2d 281, 287 (Cal. 1951).
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against such a choice," the instruction emphasizes the true nature of
the elements of premeditation and deliberation. However, the under-
lying problem remained. Since "the law does not undertake to mea-
sure in units of time the length of the period" necessary to truly
premeditate and deliberate, and since the "cold, calculated judgment"
can be arrived at in a "short period of time," a finding of virtually
instantaneous premeditation and deliberation was still very much a
possibility. In such circumstances, there must be a determination of
whether the facts reveal only a bare intent to kill or instead an intent
to kill that derives from the kind of cold, considered calculation de-
scribed in the instruction.
In Anderson the court considered the question of how to assess
the sufficiency of the facts to prove a cold, considered intent to kill.
The defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to
death for the brutal killing of a young, vulnerable victim, his ten year
old stepdaughter. The facts established that the defendant was drink-
ing heavily for several days, including the day of the killing, and was
home alone with the victim. The victim's nude body was found in her
bedroom, hidden under some blankets and boxes. Over sixty stab
wounds, some superficial, some severe, had been inflicted. Blood was
discovered in every room in the house. The victim's torn and bloodied
dress and her panties, out of which the crotch had been torn, were
found, but there was no evidence of sexual assault. 189 Defendant ar-
gued evidence of premeditation and deliberation was insufficient to
support the verdict.
The court noted that, although premeditation and deliberation
could be proved by circumstantial evidence, the brutality of a killing
without more did not prove these elements. 190 The court outlined
what it referred to as "standards, derived from the nature of premedi-
tation and deliberation as employed by the Legislature and inter-
preted by this court, for the kind of evidence which is sufficient to
sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation," 19 1 and described
three categories of evidence relevant to determining the existence of
premeditation and deliberation:
(1) facts about how and what defendant did prior to the actual kill-
ing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed
toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing-what
may be characterized as "planning" activity; (2) facts about the de-
fendant's prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from
189. See People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942, 944-45 (Cal. 1968).
190. See id. at 947.
191. Id. at 948.
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which the jury could reasonably infer a "motive" to kill the victim,
which inference of motive, together with facts of type (1) or (3),
would in turn support an inference that the killing was the result of
a "pre-existing reflection" and "careful thought and weighing of
considerations" rather than "mere unconsidered or rash impulse
hastily executed.. .;" (3) facts about the nature of the killing from
which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particu-
lar and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed
according to a "preconceived design" to take his victim's life in a
particular way for a "reason" which the jury can reasonably infer
from facts of type (1) or (2).192
The court reviewed earlier cases with this analytical framework in
mind and concluded that verdicts of first degree murder were typi-
cally sustained when there is evidence of all three types, or failing that,
where there is extremely strong evidence of type (1) or evidence of
type (2) in conjunction with either type (1) or (3). 193
Applying the above analysis to the facts of Anderson, the court
found no evidence of conduct preceding the killing which suggested
planning, rejected the prosecution's argument that the killing was sex-
ually motivated, 194 and found that the nature of the killing, while very
brutal, did not circumstantially suggest a planned killing. Rather, the
court found the multiple stab wounds equally consistent with a "hasty
and impetuous" act of killing and thus could not reasonably support a
finding of premeditation and deliberation. 195 Because it found proof
of premeditation and deliberation insufficient, the court reduced An-
derson's conviction to second degree murder. 196
Factually, Anderson is an extremely troubling case. The murder
was particularly violent and unprovoked, and the victim was a vulnera-
ble child. But in terms of the court's application of the statute, it is
hard to argue with the decision. The problem with the result in Ander-
son, if there is one, results from the legislative definition of first degree
192. Id. at 949 (citations omitted).
193. See id.
194. The prosecution had argued a sexual motive for the killing, based on the victim's
having been found nude, the crotch having been torn out of the victim's panties, knife
wounds in the vaginal area, and the evidence which suggested that the defendant was not
fully dressed at the time of the killing (the only clothes belonging to defendant which were
found with blood on them were a pair of socks with blood encrusted on the soles and a
pair of boxer shorts). See id. The court found this evidence insufficient to support a reason-
able inference of a sexual motive. See id. at 952.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 953. The jury was instructed on two possible theories of first degree mur-
der: (1) premeditation and deliberation; and (2) murder which is committed in the perpe-
tration or attempted perpetration of an act punishable under California Penal Code
section 288 (sexual perversion with a child). The court found the evidence on this latter
theory insufficient also. See id. at 953-56.
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murder. The legislature designated deliberate and premeditated
murders as being of the first degree; it did not so designate particu-
larly violent, unprovoked murders of vulnerable victims. If the conclu-
sion that Anderson's killing was not first degree murder is wrong, the
fault lies in the legislative definition of first degree murder, not in the
court's application of that definition to the facts of the case.' 9 7 The
opinion reflected a serious attempt to give meaningful effect to the
statutory distinction between first and second degree murder. Noth-
ing about the decision was particularly groundbreaking; it appeared
merely to say, perhaps more clearly, what the court often had said
before.' 98
V. Political Climate Heralds a "Retro" Era-1980 to the
Present
By the early 1980s the decisions of the California Supreme Court
suggested the beginning of another major shift in the court's ap-
proach to premeditation and deliberation, a shift in a distinctly back-
ward direction. Cases decided since then have more in common with
decisions from one hundred years ago than with cases decided in the
1950s and 1960s. 199
Although pinpointing the multiple forces that contributed to this
change is not easy, one piece of the puzzle is clear. In 1981, the legisla-
ture amended section 189 by adding the following provision: "To
prove the killing was 'deliberate and premeditated,' it shall not be
necessary to prove the defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected
upon the gravity of his act. '200
197. See SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL 100-05 (1998).
198. For example, in People v. Holt the court observed that "it has been held that the
existence of a deliberate purpose to kill may be inferred from the character of the weapon
used, the circumstances surrounding and showing the relationship of the parties, and the
acts and conduct of the accused." People v. Holt, 153 P.2d 21, 34 (Cal. 1944) (citing Peo-
ple v. Cook, 102 P.2d 752 (Cal. 1940)). See also People v. Smith, 104 P.2d 510 (Cal. 1940).
In People v. Tubby, the court noted the following as being important in assessing the suffi-
ciency of evidence of premeditation and deliberation, "the previous relations between de-
fendant and the victim, the actions of the defendant before as well as at the tine of the
killing, and the means by which the homicide is accomplished." People v. Tubby, 207 P.2d
51, 55 (Cal. 1949).
199. Cases decided during the 1970s generally did not involve challenges related to
premeditation and deliberation. Many changes in California's death penalty law occurred
during that decade and appellate challenges focused primarily on the constitutionality of
the various death penalty schemes. See Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 7, at 1307.
200. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (Lexis Supp. 2002).
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Without question, this amendment was intended to undo the
Wolff decision. By this amendment, the legislature, in effect, said
mental abnormalities are irrelevant; no matter what the quality of the
thought processes, if the accused thinks about the killing in advance
and considers alternatives, premeditation and deliberation are
proved.
This statutory change cannot explain the broader shift in the di-
rection of the court's decisions. Cases involving qualitative chal-
lenges-those where the defendant claims he planned the killing but
did so without the "mature and meaningful reflection" required-
were always a distinct and limited subgroup. Most premeditation and
deliberation challenges have been based on claims that the decision
to kill was spontaneous, without prior reflection-i.e., that there sim-
ply was no premeditation and deliberation. The amendment to sec-
tion 189 had no effect on these cases.
The more general change is likely tied to a shift in the political
climate in the society at large, a shift that had a profound impact on
the criminal justice system. Lawrence M. Friedman, a prominent legal
historian, described the times as follows:
In retrospect, the 1950s and 1960s represented a peak or high
point in the movement to make criminal justice more humane,
and to tilt the balance away from the police and prosecution. A
backlash or reaction then set in. A wave of conservatism swept over
the country. It had its roots in the great fear: the fear and hatred of
crime. This wave led to the collapse of the campaign against the
death penalty; it brought about a reaction against parole and the
indeterminate sentence; it engulfed the Durham rule, and put an
end to "progress" in the insanity defense. 20
The fear and hatred of crime was rooted in reality. The rate of
violent crime, always high in the United States, had risen dramati-
cally.202 The country had moved into a period of disorienting political
upheavals including the civil rights movement and the anti-war move-
ment. Cities experienced major race riots. Robert Kennedy and Mar-
201. LAWRENCEM. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HIsToRY 404 (1993).
The reference to the Durham rule is to a test of insanity adopted in People v. Durham, 214
F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). In an opinion by Judge Bazelon, the court in Durham rejected
the M'Naghten rule and adopted in its stead a new "test," theoretically more modern and
scientifically advanced. The test provided that "an accused is not criminally responsible if
his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect." Durham, 214 F.2d at
874-75. This rule was later abandoned by the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Brawner, 471
F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). After the insanity acquittal in the trial ofJohn Hinckley for the
attempted murder of President Reagan, Congress enacted legislation returning to some-
thing akin to the M'Naghten Rule in federal courts. See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1994).
202. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 201, at 451.
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tin Luther King, Jr. were assassinated. The public perceived itself as
besieged by crime, both of the traditional and political variety.
Playing to an understandable anxiety and anger about crime
proved to be an unbeatably successful formula for politicians. Fear of
crime also provided a constant source of attention-grabbing headlines
for the media.203 Although most thoughtful observers concur that the
causes of crime and of variations in the rate of crime are complex,
simplistic explanations are often appealing. In this era, both politi-
cians and the media often pointed the finger of blame at the courts
and the criminal justice system generally.
Although the shift in the political climate was a nationwide phe-
nomenon, the effects of the shift seemed particularly pronounced in
California. One particular case, the murder of George Moscone, a
popular San Francisco mayor, and Harvey Milk, a member of the
Board of Supervisors and leader in the gay community, by Dan White,
a former member of the Board of Supervisors, became a symbol to
California citizens of all that was wrong with the courts and the crimi-
nal justice system.20 4 This case, and the public outrage it engendered,
led directly to a series of actions by the legislature (including the
amendment to section 189), as well as initiatives passed by the electo-
203. The public appears to have an insatiable appetite for news of violent crime, an
appetite the media is willing to feed. A San Francisco Chronicle article reported that from
1993 to 1996, the homicide rate in the United States dropped twenty percent. During that
same time period, the evening network news reports of killings increased by an average of
seven hundred twenty-one percent over the preceding three years. This article also re-
ported that media coverage of crime clearly affects public attitudes. A 1994 poll conducted
by the Los Angeles Times reported that sixty-five percent of those surveyed said their feel-
ings about crime were based primarily on what they saw in the media, as compared with
twenty-one percent who cited personal experience and thirteen percent who said both
equally. See Howard Kurtz, Homicide Rate Down, Except on the Evening News, S.F. CHRON., Aug.
13, 1997, at A8.
204. In 1979, Dan White, a former member of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors,
shot and killed Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk, a leader in the gay
community. White was arrested and charged with first degree premeditated and deliber-
ated murder. White had clearly fired the shots that had killed these two political leaders;
his defense was that he suffered from clinical depression and did not act with malice afore-
thought. Testimony in support of that defense suggested that a manifestation of his disease
was the tendency to consume an unbalanced diet, including large amounts ofjunk food;
one such item of food mentioned was "Twinkies." See People v. White, 172 Cal. Rptr. 612
(Ct. App. 1981). This testimony was seized upon by the press and blown entirely out of
proportion, so that when the jury convicted White of voluntary manslaughter, the case
became infamous as having established the "Twinkie defense." The San Francisco commu-
nity and the broader California population reacted with outrage at what was perceived to
be a gross miscarriage of justice.
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rate, 20 5 aimed at abolishing the Wells-Gorshen Rule and otherjudicial
innovations of the preceding era.20 6
The death penalty also became a lightning-rod political issue in
this period. Beginning in 1972, decisions by the California Supreme
Court20 7 and the United States Supreme Court 20 8 invalidated, either
directly or by implication, several California death penalty schemes.
Each time, the legislature and/or the electorate responded swiftly to
enact new legislation to restore and often to expand the death pen-
alty. 20 9 Frustrated by the California Supreme Court's resistance to the
application of the death penalty, the electorate took the unprece-
dented step of removing the Chief Justice and two of her colleagues
from the court in 1986.210 California's Republican governor replaced
the ousted members of the court with justices of markedly more con-
servative judicial philosophy.211 The first decisions, signaling the
court's most .recent stance on premeditation and deliberation, ap-
peared a few years before this historic election. But these decisions
came after a decade or more of changing political winds that may
have had a more or less subtle influence on the court's decisions. Af-
ter the 1986 election, in many ways, California had an entirely new
supreme court. 212
A. The "Retro" Era in Practice
Given the profound changes both outside and inside the court,
its philosophical shift may well have been predictable. Nevertheless,
given limits imposed by stare decisis, some justification for the new
tack had to be articulated. Other than the repudiation of Wolff no
statutory changes pointed to a new course. The court has not rejected
directly earlier seminal cases-neither those that articulated legal doc-
205. SeeJohn Balzar, Assembly Votes to Ban "Diminished Capacity," S.F. CHRON., Aug. 21,
1981, at 1; John Balzar, Brown Signs Bill to End "Dan White" Defense, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 11,
1981, at A8; Katy Butler, The White Verdict Aftermath, S.F. CHRON., May 23, 1979, at 1.
206. See Mounts, supra note 27, at 353-59.
207. See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972); Rockwell v. Superior Court, 556
P.2d 1101 (Cal. 1976).
208. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976).
209. See Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 7, at 1306-17.
210. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 201, at 321.
211. See id.
212. In part the court was "new" based on the simple fact of the personnel changes that
resulted from the 1986 election. Beyond the change in the membership, the court was
undoubtedly impacted by this unprecedented politicization of the court and the real possi-
bility of public ouster of individual justices.
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trine through review of jury instructions, nor those reversing convic-
tions based on insufficiency of the evidence. 213 Yet in the sixteen years
since 1986, when the Chief Justice and her two colleagues were re-
moved from the court, not a single case has been reversed based on
the insufficiency of the evidence to establish premeditation and delib-
eration. The court has rejected such challenges and affirmed first de-
gree convictions where evidence of premeditation and deliberation
was either non-existent or the product of appellate speculation. In
practical effect, the current court simply has undone judicial clarifica-
tion accomplished in the era that began with Holt and returned the
law to a state in which first and second degree murder are indistin-
guishable and the choice between them is left to the complete discre-
tion of the jury. Unfortunately, given the grisly nature of the killings
involved, the facts of the cases must be analyzed at some length.
1. The "Anderson-like" Cases
Evidence of the court's new attitude first became apparent in the
1980s with decisions in several cases that shared similar fact patterns.
In People v. Alcala,214 People v. Frank,215 People v. Hovey, 216 and People v.
Pensinger,217 the defendants argued that there was insufficient evi-
dence of premeditation and deliberation. In each case, the defendant
abducted a young girl or infant under circumstances that indicated
greater or lesser amounts of planning regarding the abduction. Evi-
dence was introduced in each case to establish that the defendant's
purpose was to engage in some sort of sexual conduct with the victim.
Each of the victims was killed in circumstances with no apparent eye-
witnesses. Each victim was subjected to a variety of horrible injuries.
As this brief description reveals, factually the cases in this group
had much in common with the Anderson case itself. However, in con-
trast to the decision in Anderson, in each of these cases, the court
found sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation.
In each case, the court cited as evidence of "planning activity"
facts which did not relate directly to a plan regarding the ultimate fate
of the victim but rather supported the inference that the child's ab-
213. This includes what was surely its most controversial decision in this area, People v.
Anderson. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
214. 685 P.2d 1126 (Cal. 1984).
215. 700 P.2d 415 (Cal. 1985).
216. 749 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1988).
217. 805 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1991).
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duction was planned.218 Such evidence is not inconsistent with a plan
to kill but, in itself, did not establish the abductor's ultimate intention.
In Alcala, the court cited as additional evidence the fact that the de-
fendant brought along a weapon that was ultimately used against the
victim.2 1 9 However, the weapon was a knife, an item not uncommonly
carried without deadly intention. In Hovey, the court made a similar
argument, although the evidence regarding the type of weapon that
inflicted the wounds was equivocal. 220
As to evidence of motive, in Alcala, Frank, and Hovey, the court
suggested that defendants killed the victims in order to eliminate the
only witness to the defendants' crimes.221 In Pensinger, because the vic-
tim was only five months old and thus too young to be a witness, this
rationale did not apply. 222 Instead, the court cited two possible mo-
tives, one apparently argued by the district attorney at trial223 and an-
218. See Alcala, 685 P.2d at 1131-32; Frank, 700 P.2d at 427; Hovey, 749 P.2d at 781;
Pensinger, 805 P.2d at 909.
219. See Alcala, 685 P.2d at 1137.
220. Prosecution evidence indicated the injuries were inflicted either by a "blunt ob-
ject" or by a "sharp instrument such as a knife." Hovey, 749 P.2d at 780.
221. See Alcala, 685 P.2d at 1138; Frank, 700 P.2d at 427; Hovy, 749 P.2d at 782. It
should be noted that only in Hovey was there any evidence that specifically pointed to this
motive. In that case there was testimony that the defendant blindfolded the victim and that
the injuries were inflicted after the blindfold slipped and the victim was able to see the
defendant. See Hovey, 749 P.2d at 782. Although in these cases it appears that the court was
referring to the fact that the victim was a witness to the preceding crime of kidnapping and
sexual molestation, the court later applied this rationale even where it was unclear that any
crime other than the murder itself took place. See, e.g., People v. Perez, 831 P.2d 1159 (Cal.
1992). If applicable in this latter situation, this rationale could apply to every killing that
takes place outside the presence of other witnesses, a category that includes a large per-
centage of homicides.
222. The defendant let the five year old brother of the victim out of the vehicle and left
him on the side of the road before molesting and killing his sister. See Pensinger, 805 P.2d at
904. This fact was noted by the court as evidence that the defendant planned the killing.
The court stated, "[the defendant] dropped off the child who was old enough to be able to
hinder him in any way or identify him and testify to his acts." Id. at 909. In fact, this child
later did testify against the defendant at trial. Had the defendant, rather than dropping the
child off, instead killed him, it seems the court would then maintain that the defendant's
motive for that killing was to eliminate the only witness who could identify him.
223. Earlier in the evening, the children's mother and the defendant went into a bar,
leaving the victim and her five year old brother in the truck the defendant was driving.
While the adults were in the bar, the victim's brother apparently pointed the defendant's
rifle at a man who was in the parking lot. That man confiscated the rifle. The defendant
became enraged when he discovered the rifle missing and made various attempts to find
the rifle. See id. at 904. At trial the district attorney argued that the victim's death was
somehow committed in revenge for what the defendant believed was the theft of his rifle.
See id. at 909.
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other by the state on appeal. 224 In apparent recognition that evidence
of either motive was not terribly persuasive, the court stated that "the
incomprehensibility of the motive does not mean that the jury could
not reasonably infer that the defendant entertained and acted on
it."22
5
The court last assessed evidence regarding the manner of killing.
As noted, each victim was subjected to an array of injuries, some of
nearly unspeakable brutality. Such viciousness is generally contrasted
with the kind of cool efficiency typical of premeditated and deliber-
ated killings; certainly that was the court's position in Anderson, where
the court suggested that the "only inference which the evidence rea-
sonably supports . . . is that the killing resulted from a random, vio-
lent, indiscriminate attack rather than from deliberately placed
wounds inflicted according to a preconceived design." 226 While it may
be true that a brutal method of killing is not inconsistent with a
planned murder, it is also true that brutality, in itself, is not particu-
larly suggestive of a planned killing. The opinion in Alcala typifies the
court's approach in this group of cases. The court noted the brutal
injuries and then said, with no further explanation, "[w]hen consid-
ered in light of the planning and motive evidence, this brutal method
of killing supports the inference of a calculated design to ensure
death, rather than an unconsidered 'explosion' of violence." 227 Hav-
ing thereby established Alcala as precedent, in later cases, where the
court was confronted with similar injuries, the court then simply cited
Alcala as precedent for the position that such injuries may suggest a
premeditated and deliberated killing.2 28
In Anderson the child was killed in her own home. In each of
these cases the child was taken from somewhere else.2 29 Little else dis-
tinguishes the facts of these cases from those of Anderson. The killings
in these cases were clearly of appalling brutality. Whether these kill-
224. Perhaps realizing the weakness of the prosecution's motive argument at trial, on
appeal the state argued a different motive-that the defendant killed the child in order to
have sexual intercourse with her. See id. at 909.
225. Id.
226. People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942, 952 (Cal. 1968).
227. People v. Alcala, 685 P.2d 1126, 1138 (Cal. 1984).
228. See People v. Hovey, 749 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1988); Pensinger, 805 P.2d at 909.
229. In fact, in Pensinger, it could be argued that defendant did not really take the
child, that the mother left the child in defendant's truck, and defendant merely drove off
with the child in the truck. See Pensinger, 805 P.2d at 904. In 1990 the legislature added
kidnapping to the list of felonies in section 189. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (Lexis Supp.
2002). Presumably from that time on cases like these will be prosecuted on a first degree
felony murder theory rather than as premeditated and deliberated.
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ings were the product of careful planning and cool reflection is much
less clear.230
2. The "Miscellaneous" Cases
The watered down application of the Anderson categories in the
cases described above laid the groundwork for a second group of
cases decided in the 1990s. These later decisions involved a variety of
factual circumstances and appear to have in common only the court's
willingness to stretch facts, to engage in speculation, and on occasion
to assume facts that did not exist, in order to find sufficient evidence
of premeditation and deliberation. These cases provide clear evidence
that, without expressly rejecting Anderson, the court has construed it
into insignificance. In the earlier cases the court applied the Anderson
analysis without criticism but found evidence of premeditation and
deliberation sufficient on the most minimal facts. In later cases, the
court explicitly down-played the significance of the Anderson factors,
230. One additional case, People v. Lucero, 750 P.2d 1342 (Cal. 1988), was similar in that
it involved the murder of two young girls. However, the circumstances of the killings were
more puzzling. There was no abduction. The victims lived near defendant's home and
were missing for only a short period of time before they were killed in the defendant's
home. There was no evidence that the girls were sexually molested, nor was there evidence
of any other readily apparent motive. One victim was killed by blows to her head by a blunt
object; the other was killed by ligature strangulation, likely with a necklace the victim was
wearing. In sustaining the verdict of first degree murder, the court the court observed that,
because it was "unlikely" that the girls would have gone into the home of a strange man
willingly, ajury might reasonably infer that the defendant "lured or compelled" the girls to
enter, though no such evidence was introduced. See id. at 1348. The court conceded that
evidence of motive was weak and again relied on the "elimination of witness" rationale. See
id. Since there was no evidence of kidnapping or other crime against the girls, it was un-
clear what crime the girls had witnessed. As to the manner of killing, the court did not
suggest that a blow from a blunt object suggested premeditation and deliberation. As to
the ligature strangulation, on the one hand, the court agreed that this manner of killing
did not always evidence preconceived design, but went on to say, without explanation, that
"a jury could have viewed the strangulation as a deliberate manner of killing sufficient to
show a 'preconceived design.'" Id. at 1349.
The decision in Lucero is particularly troubling because of the absence of any hint of a
reason for the killings. The victims were not sexually molested and none of the other com-
mon motivations for murder were involved. Based on the majority's opinion, the murder is
entirely incomprehensible and without explanation. Facts set out injustice Mosk's concur-
ring and dissenting opinion suggest a cause. Prior to the charges in this case, Lucero had
never been in trouble with the law. He entered military service at the age of sixteen and
spent seven and one half years in the Army, with much of his service in combat in Vietnam.
According to the evidence, Lucero experienced two particularly traumatic experiences
during combat which, according to expert testimony, resulted in a classic case of post-
traumatic stress syndrome. There was evidence that some of the circumstances preceding
the murders of the girls may have triggered a combat flashback. See id. at 1358 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
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noting that they were not intended to be exclusive measures of the
presence of premeditation and deliberation. However, the court did
not identify other types of relevant evidence and instead simply ap-
plied the factors already identified in a less rigorous fashion. These
cases suggest the court's real quarrel with the Anderson decision was
not the exclusivity of the categories of evidence, but rather with the
strict application of those categories to the facts.
The decision in People v. Wharton231 was the first unmistakable in-
dicator of the court's turnaround. The defendant was charged with
murdering his live-in girlfriend. Both apparently had serious alcohol
and drug problems. The victim's body was found in a large cardboard
barrel covered with a plastic bag in the kitchen of the residence. The
autopsy revealed that the victim was struck three times on the head
with a blunt instrument, probably a hammer. In the opinion of the
pathologist, the victim died of asphyxia rather than from the cerebral
contusions. A toolbox was found in the garage and a hammer found
in the house under a day bed. Evidence suggested that, in order to
buy cocaine, defendant sold some of the victim's property after her
death, and perhaps before as well. Defendant confessed to the killing
but claimed it occurred during the heat of an argument and was not
the product of premeditation and deliberation. 232
The court noted that evidence of premeditation and deliberation
was not overwhelming, but nevertheless sufficient.23 3 In a superficially
straight-forward Anderson analysis, the court first focused on the rela-
tionship of the hammer and the toolbox to show evidence of plan-
ning, arguing that one of two scenarios existed. First, defendant may
have removed the hammer from the toolbox ahead of time and
placed it in a convenient spot, "planning to be in a rage."234 Aterna-
tively, when defendant and the victim argued, the defendant became
angry and went to the garage to get the hammer, intending to use it to
kill the victim. 23 5 Under the latter scenario, the act of going to retrieve
the hammer would indicate planning. The court found evidence of a
plausible motive from the fact that defendant may have been stealing
from the victim before her death. 236 The court conceded that the
manner of killing revealed nothing about the existence of premedita-
231. 809 P.2d 290 (Cal. 1991).
232. See id. at 300-01.
233. See id. at 303-04.
234. Id.
235. See id.
236. See id.
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tion and deliberation. 23 7 However, the court observed that the Ander-
son decision did not require evidence in all three categories and stated
that evidence of planning in conjunction with motive evidence was
sufficient.
The court's observation, however, ignored the absence of any
substantial evidence of planning; the evidence both of planning activ-
ity and of motive was extremely weak. The prosecution introduced no
evidence regarding the location of the hammer prior to the killing.
There was no evidence that the hammer was ever in the toolbox, or
that if it was, that it was removed from that location shortly before the
killing. 238 Nor was there any evidence that defendant went to the ga-
rage or anywhere else to get the hammer during the course of an
argument. 239 The court based its alternative scenarios on the prosecu-
tor's argument rather than any evidence introduced in the case. 240
Without evidence of planning activity, the extremely weak evidence of
motive clearly would have been insufficient to support a finding of
premeditation and deliberation. The evidence might have been suffi-
cient to support a finding that defendant intended to kill the victim,
but there was no evidence that he coolly considered the killing in
advance.
More recently, the court, while continuing to engage in the An-
derson analysis, has discounted openly the decision as any substantive
limitation on the proof of premeditation and deliberation. In People v.
Thomas241 the court stated that
unreflective reliance on Anderson for a definition of premeditation
is inappropriate. The Anderson analysis was intended as a frame-
work to assist reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence
supports an inference that the killing resulted from preexisting re-
flection and weighing of considerations. It did not refashion the
elements of first degree murder or alter the substantive law of mur-
der in any way.2 4 2
In Perez, 2 4 3 the court reiterated what it had said in Thomas and went on
to say, "[t] he Anderson guidelines are descriptive, not normative ....
In identifying categories of evidence bearing on premeditation and
deliberation, Anderson did not purport to establish an exhaustive list
237. See id. at 304.
238. See id. at 343 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
239. See id.
240. See id. at 303.
241. 828 P.2d 101 (Cal. 1992).
242. Id. at 114.
243. People v. Perez, 831 P.2d 1159 (Cal. 1992).
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that would exclude all other types and combinations of evidence that
could support a finding of premeditation and deliberation. '" 244
The court may be correct that the descriptive categories in the
Anderson decision were not intended to be exclusive. In describing the
categories, the court stated in Anderson, "l[t] he type of evidence which
this court has found sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation
and deliberation falls into three basic categories" 245 perhaps sug-
gesting that other relevant evidence might exist outside these basic
categories. Even if it did not intend in Anderson to leave room for
other categories of evidence, the court would be remiss if it failed to
consider other types of evidence relevant to the existence of premedi-
tation and deliberation. It is clearly true that the Anderson decision, in
setting forth an analytic framework, did not purport to, nor could it
have affected the statutory elements of premeditation and delibera-
tion. Yet an honest reading of cases such as Thomas and Perez suggests,
not that the court has discovered new categories of evidence that tend
to prove premeditation and deliberation, but rather that it is simply
applying the existing categories in a less rigorous fashion.
Consideration of the facts in the Thomas and Perez cases illustrates
this point. In Thomas, the defendant was charged with two counts of
premeditated and deliberated first degree murder. The jury returned
a verdict of one count of first degree and one count of second degree
murder.246 Over strong dissenting opinions by Justices Mosk and Ken-
nard, the majority in Thomas found sufficient evidence of premedita-
tion and deliberation to support the one conviction of first degree
murder. Defendant and the two victims all resided in "Rainbow Vil-
lage," an area set aside by the city of Berkeley to provide living space
for people previously living in their vehicles on the public streets. De-
fendant was seen in the company of the victims near the area where
the two were killed and owned a rifle consistent with the type of
wounds inflicted.247 The victims were first beaten and then shot in the
head at point-blank range. 248
244. Id. at 1163 (citations omitted).
245. People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942, 949 (Cal. 1968) (emphasis added).
246. The majority opinion never clearly indicates the fact that, although charged with
two counts of first degree murder, the jury convicted defendant of first degree murder only
as to one victim. The first clear statement of this fact appeared injustice Kennard's dissent.
See Thomas, 828 P.2d at 136 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
247. Thomas was seen with the rifle a few hours before the killings. See id. at 107. When
questioned by the police, he claimed that the rifle was stolen the night of the murders. See
id. at 109, 111.
248. See id. at 106.
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The following evidence was noted as indicative of planning. A wit-
ness testified that he saw defendant with the victims at approximately
2:30 A.M., but did not testify that defendant had a rifle with him. From
this, according to the majority, the jury could infer that defendant
returned to his car to get the rifle and the ammunition before com-
mitting the murders. Further, evidence indicated that the rifle lacked
a clip, and in order to fire a second shot, one had to eject the ex-
pended case by opening the bolt and hand loading a second round
into the chamber. The majority found that the actions required for
loading and reloading the rifle suggested planning. Last, the majority
pointed to the fact that the murders took place outside "Rainbow Vil-
lage," at a location where a weapon would not be readily accessible.
249
There was little evidence of motive. At sentencing the trial court
declared the killings to have been committed "without apparent mo-
tive, nor any rhyme or reason. '250 The majority, however, found mo-
tive evidence in that defendant may have felt the need to eliminate a
witness to the first of the two murders. 251
In assessing the evidentiary value of the manner of killing, the
majority noted that the single contact shot to the victim's neck sug-
gested premeditation. 252 The majority conceded that the beatings in-
flicted on both victims prior to their killings suggest rage, but
concluded that such beatings do not preclude an inference of pre-
meditation, observing that "[t]houghts may follow each other with
great rapidity, and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at
quickly .... "253
Thomas is a good example of the extent to which the court is will-
ing to go in order to sustain a conviction of first degree murder. Evi-
dence in each of the Anderson categories was highly problematic. 254 As
249. See id. at 115.
250. Id.
251. See id.
252. The majority actually stated, "both victims were killed by single contact shots, to
[one victim's] head and [the other victim's] neck, a method sufficiently 'particular and
exacting' to warrant an inference that defendant was acting according to a preconceived
design." Id. However, since the jury returned a verdict of second degree murder as to one
victim, presumably the jury did not make this inference as to her killing. From this one
might question whether the jury made this inference as to the other victim, since the analy-
sis would have applied equally to both killings.
253. Id.
254. Mosk and Kennard wrote separate opinions, dissenting on the issue of the suffi-
ciency of the evidence of premeditation and deliberation. Many of the described criticisms
are set forth in these two dissenting opinions. See id. at 133-40 (Kennard, J., dissenting;
Mosk, J., dissenting).
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to evidence of planning, three areas of evidence were relied on in the
majority opinion: (1) evidence that defendant was not armed when he
was with the victims earlier, and thus must have had to return to his
vehicle to get the rifle; (2) the actions involved in loading and reload-
ing the rifle; and (3) the location of the killings.
As to the first, the witness relied on by the majority as having
provided the testimony which was the basis for the conclusion that
defendant had to return to his car to get the rifle was never asked
whether defendant possessed a rifle. He merely described seeing de-
fendant at a particular location and time and made no mention of
whether defendant was armed. As Justice Kennard noted, "failure to
respond to a question that was never asked is not evidence of
anything."255
The argument based on the reloading of the rifle presents at least
three problems. First, the majority opinion stated that the facts re-
garding the operation of the rifle "suggest planning in the loading and
reloading of the rifle." 256 No evidence whatsoever was offered as to
when the rifle was initially loaded. So the majority's argument, even if
accepted, would be limited to the actions involved in reloading the
rifle. Second, if the argument is restricted to reloading the rifle, the
evidence is highly problematic as a basis for finding premeditation
and deliberation as to the victim whose death resulted in the first de-
gree murder conviction. No evidence was introduced from which the
jury could determine the order in which the victims were killed. In
order for the first degree murder victim to have been killed after
Thomas reloaded the rifle, he would, of course, have to have been
killed second. There was simply no evidence from which the jury
could have come to that conclusion. The third problem with the "re-
loading" conduct as showing planning is more fundamental. Assum-
ing the first killing was intentional but unplanned (i.e., second degree
murder), was a sufficient additional quantum of culpability estab-
lished by reloading and shooting a second time? Is this really what is
meant by premeditation and deliberation? Courts have struggled with
the question of whether evidence of repeated blows or stabbings is
sufficient to prove premeditation and deliberation. The argument in
favor would be that, with each stab or blow, the perpetrator again de-
cided to inflict a deadly wound and thus premeditated and deliber-
ated on the act of killing. Anderson itself is an example of a case in
which such an argument apparently was made and rejected. If re-
255. Id. at 137 (Kennard,J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 115 (emphasis added).
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peated blows are insufficient, are repeated shots different? If not, is
the mere fact of reloading a weapon sufficient additional indication of
cool planning and consideration beforehand?
The last piece of evidence relied on by the majority to show plan-
ning-the location of the killing-is important primarily because of
its relationship to the need to return to get the weapon. Since, as
noted above, there was no affirmative evidence that Thomas did not
have the weapon with him, the location of the murder has little evi-
dentiary value.
The motive evidence was similarly weak. At trial, the prosecution
argued a sexual motive for the killing. The evidence supporting this
seems to have been limited to the fact that the female victim's shorts
were unbuttoned and the zipper partially unzipped, but there was no
evidence of sexual trauma. 25 7 The majority declined to resolve
whether this theory, the one which was argued to the jury, could rea-
sonably have been the basis for an inference that defendant had a
motive to kill the victim. 258 The majority chose instead to rely on the
theory that defendant's motive might have been to "eliminate a wit-
ness to [the defendant's] crimes."259 Because there is no way of know-
ing which killing took place first, there is simply no evidence in the
case which would support this inference.
As to the manner of killing evidence, in general, a single, point-
blank shot to a vital body part might suggest a planned killing, for
example, an "'execution-style' killing-which is 'particular and exact-
257. See Thomas, 828 P.2d at 115.
258. See id. Note that this evidence related to a motive to kill only one of the victims.
The defendant was convicted of second degree murder as to that victim, so presumably the
jury had a reasonable doubt as to the existence of premeditation and deliberation in her
killing. Nonetheless, a motive to kill this victim might have been relevant to the review of
evidence as to the other killing. If defendant was shown to have a motive to kill the first
victim, perhaps that would suggest that he killed her first and then killed the other victim
to eliminate a witness. See id. at 138 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
259. Justice Kennard vigorously disputed the majority's argument that People v. Alcala,
685 P.2d 1126 (Cal. 1984), supports the "witness elimination" motive in this case. Justice
Kennard argued,
[t]here, this court reasoned that "when one plans a felony against a far weaker
victim, takes her by force or fear to an isolated location, and brings along a deadly
weapon which he subsequently employs," advance planning to kill may be reason-
ably inferred. Here, there is no evidence of a separate planned felony against [the
first degree murder victim], no evidence that [the first degree murder victim] was
a victim far weaker than defendant, and no evidence that he was taken by force or
fear to an isolated location. And as Alcala cautions, use of a deadly weapon is not
necessarily evidence of a plan to kill.
Thomas, 828 P.2d at 137 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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ing' by definition. '260 The evidence as to the killing here, however,
was different-both victims were badly beaten prior to being killed.
The evidence of injuries taken as a whole was more consistent with a
brutal attack than an exacting manner of killing.
In summary, the evidence in Thomas of each of the three Anderson
factors was either weak or nonexistent. Despite the introductory re-
marks to the effect that the Anderson factors were not exclusive, the
majority suggested no other evidence that would close the evidentiary
gap.
The decision in Perez261 reveals a similar effort to conjure up pre-
meditation and deliberation from minimal facts. Defendant, the vic-
tim, and the victim's husband were high school acquaintances ten
years earlier. Defendant lived nearby and periodically drove by the
residence of the victim and her husband. The husband routinely left
the home early in the morning to go to work several hours before the
victim left. The victim was killed in her home during the time period
after her husband left for work. There was no sign of forced entry.
The physical evidence indicated a violent struggle; blood was found in
nearly every room in the house. The victim was first beaten on the
head and shoulders, probably with a fist, and then repeatedly stabbed.
She suffered thirty-eight stab wounds, none to vital organs. She bled
to death from a cut on her neck which nicked the carotid artery. A
single-edged knife blade was found near the victim's head and a piece
of the handle by her foot. This knife resembled steak knives which
were kept in the kitchen. A pathologist testified that he believed two
different knives, one double-edged, were used. The wounds inflicted
with the double-edged knife appeared to have been inflicted after
death. The defendant sustained several serious cuts to his right hand
and also less serious cuts to his left. 262
A divided court of appeal concluded that the facts were indistin-
guishable from those in Anderson and reduced the conviction to sec-
ond degree murder.263 A majority of the supreme court disagreed,
and reinstated the first degree murder conviction. Evidence of plan-
260. Id. at 135 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
261. 831 P.2d 1159 (Cal. 1992). As they did in Thomas, Justices Mosk and Kennard
again dissented here. The supreme court decision reversed a split decision of the court of
appeal which found insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation. See id. at
1166, 1178.
262. See id. at 1160-61.
263. See id. at 1160, 1163.
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ning was found in five "facts:" 264 (1) defendant's car was not observed
in the victim's driveway; 265 (2) defendant "surreptitiously entered" the
home; 266 (3) defendant obtained a knife from the kitchen; 267 (4) de-
fendant later obtained a second knife;268 and (5) defendant's conduct
after the killing, "such as the search of dresser drawers, jewelry boxes,
kitchen drawers and the changing of a Band-Aid on his bloody hand
that would appear to be inconsistent with a state of mind that would
have produced a rash, impulsive killing. '"269
On closer scrutiny, it becomes apparent that some of these "facts"
were not supported by the evidence at all; others, though perhaps rea-
sonable inferences from the facts proved, were not particularly proba-
tive of premeditation and deliberation. As to the first fact, no evidence
was presented that defendant drove to the victim's residence. Even if
he did, the fact that defendant did not park in the driveway hardly
suggests that he went there intending to kill the victim. As to the sec-
ond fact, surreptitious entry, the only evidence presented was that en-
try was not forced. An assumption that defendant entered
surreptitiously might be reasonable, though it was certainly not the
only possible assumption. 270 However, such surreptitious entry again
may not suggest even an intent to kill, let alone premeditation and
deliberation on such intent. The third and fourth facts regarding the
two knives present similar problems. The defendant might have got-
ten the steak knife from the kitchen, though there was minimal evi-
dence suggesting he did so. 27 1 Likewise, defendant may have obtained
the second knife, but no evidence was introduced as to the source of
that knife. There was no evidence that such a double-edged knife was
kept in the kitchen, and in fact, the prosecutor argued that defendant
brought the second knife with him, not that he retrieved it from the
264. More accurately, these are at best described as inferences from facts. As to some,
even that description is questionable.
265. See id. at 1164.
266. Id.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. Id. at 1165.
270. As Justice Crosby observed in the court of appeal decision, "there was no evidence
at all that Perez entered unlawfully or uninvited." Id. at 1176.
271. The only evidence on this subject was that the single-edged knife matched a set of
steak knives kept in the kitchen drawer and that there was a drop of blood in the drawer.
See id. at 1161, 1164. There was no testimony that a knife was missing from the drawer. Nor
was there any way of determining whether defendant obtained the knife or whether in-
stead, the victim took up the knife, perhaps in self-defense, and defendant subsequently
overpowered her and then used the knife against her. See id. at 1174.
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kitchen.2 72 Thus, little about defendant's use of a second knife sug-
gested prior planning. The last "fact"-the defendant's activities after
the killing-does not appear to support the conclusion urged by the
majority. In fact, these actions seem frantic and disorganized, and to
the extent that post-killing actions shed light on intent relating to the
killing, these actions would suggest an unplanned killing.
There was virtually no evidence of motive. The court relied on
the witness elimination theory,273 but no evidence was offered of any
crime which the victim witnessed, necessitating her elimination. Fur-
ther, at least as to murders committed without witnesses-a category
that includes a large percentage of murders-this rationale would in-
evitably apply and would elevate many run-of-the-mill second degree
murders to first degree. At that, such a motive may only support a
finding of intent to kill, not of premeditation and deliberation.27 4 The
manner of killing, nearly identical to that in Anderson, could hardly be
characterized as an "exacting manner of killing." In short, there was
no substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation.2 75
In Perez, the court distinguished Anderson and found the case
more analogous to Wharton. However, as suggested by the discussion
of Wharton, this analysis founders on the fact that, in the first instance,
there was no real basis for distinguishing Wharton from Anderson. As
the court continues to engage in analyses of the sort seen in Wharton,
Thomas, and Perez, it has an increasing number of cases on which it can
rely to distinguish Anderson based on indistinguishable facts.
The case of Sanchez illustrates this process at work. Defendant was
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death based on his
272. See id. at 1173-74.
273. See id. at 1164.
274. See id. at 1177 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
275. In his dissent, Justice Mosk suggested an alternative interpretation of the evidence
which seemed more in accordance with what the evidence actually indicated. He suggested
the following:
Considered as a whole, the record tells one reasonable tale. Defendant and the
victim had an undisclosed friendship. As she was attempting to conceive a child
through artificial insemination with donor sperm, the victim terminated the rela-
tionship. Around that time, defendant began driving past her house frequently.
On the day in question, he went to the house and entered without force. There
was soon a confrontation. Defendant started to beat the victim with his fists. She
took up a knife. In the ensuing struggle, he sustained defensive wounds to his
hands. He got hold of the knife, stabbed her, and broke the weapon. He seized
another knife. In the meantime, she died. He proceeded to stab her now-dead
body. He searched through the house for some item or items that might betray
his identity. He then fled.
Id. at 1175 (Mosk,J., dissenting).
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actions as an accomplice. 27 6 The principal and defendant went to the
home of the parents of the principal. The principal intended either to
borrow money or to rob his parents, and became embroiled in an
argument with his father, ultimately causing his father's death by in-
flicting numerous stab wounds. 277
The court began its analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence in a
similar manner as in Thomas and Perez, downplaying the restrictions
imposed by the Anderson decision, stating that " [t] he Anderson factors,
while helpful for purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to finding
first degree premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive." 278 Yet in
the subsequent analysis, as was also the case in Thomas and Perez, the
court considered each of the Anderson categories and did not refer-
ence any other type of evidence.
In describing planning activity, the court suggested that the prin-
cipal formed an intent to kill, at the latest, during the argument with
his father, and that he then obtained a knife with which to carry out
his intention.279 The court apparently believed the decision to get the
knife and its subsequent use demonstrated planning.28 0 Despite the
fact that Sanchez was acquitted on the robbery charge,281 the court
cited robbery as the motive for the killing.28 2 As to the manner of
killing, the attack occurred over a number of rooms, indicating, in the
words of the court, that the victim's "repeated attempts to break away
from his murderers were consistently thwarted by the attackers' relent-
276. See People v. Sanchez, 906 P.2d 1129 (Cal. 1996). A considerable factual dispute
existed regarding whether defendant participated personally in the killings and if so, the
extent to which he participated. See id.
277. See id. at 1139.
278. Id. at 1149.
279. See id. The evidence as to the identity of the murder weapon and its original loca-
tion was not at all clear. The opinion states,
police found a knife block with four empty spaces in the kitchen. Two knives,
without bloodstains, were in the kitchen sink. There were slash marks on the cabi-
nets directly above the knife holder. That same evening, the police recovered a
knife and sharpening stone that appeared to have blood on them. No finger-
prints were found on these items.
Id. at 1140. The opinion continues that the victims "died as a result of massive hemorrhag-
ing due to multiple stab wounds, although the type of instrument that inflicted the wounds
could not be conclusively determined." Id.
280. While the court never said this explicitly, it simply noted that the principal ob-
tained a knife and then used it. Immediately thereafter the court said, "[o]ur cases hold
that planning activity occurring over a short period of time is sufficient to find premedita-
tion." d. at 1149.
281. See id. at 1139.
282. See id. at 1149-50.
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less pursuit of him, even after he was gravely wounded. '283 The court
invoked the ever-useful language regarding the brief time period nec-
essary to premeditate and deliberate and then concluded that the
above described evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction of
first degree murder.
It is important to focus once again on just how minimal the evi-
dence of premeditation and deliberation was in this case. In terms of
"planning activity," the court offered no evidence other than "ob-
taining the knife." As proof of prior planning, this evidence is flawed
at many levels. First, there is no evidence that the killer "obtained" the
knife. The police found a knife that "appeared to have blood on
[it] ,"284 but there was no proof regarding the location of this knife
before the killing. So, for example, it is impossible to determine
whether the principal carried this knife as a matter of routine. The
court referred to the police having found a knife block with four
empty spaces in the kitchen and two knives with no blood stains in the
kitchen sink.285 The court also referred to "slash marks ... above the
knife holder,"286 but made no reference to any evidence tying these
slash marks to the altercation in this case. 28 7 Second, even if the killer
did "obtain the knife," there is no proof of the killer's location when
the knife was obtained. 288 The evidence established that the struggle
took place throughout the house.289 Thus it is entirely possible that
the victim and the killer were struggling in the kitchen, and the "ob-
taining" of the knife consisted merely of picking up a readily available
weapon. Finally, after relying exclusively on this most minimal activity
to establish premeditation and deliberation, the court then noted
without further comment that "the type of instrument that inflicted
the wounds could not be conclusively determined."290
Regarding evidence of motive, as noted above, the court cited
robbery as the motive for the murder. The evidence that defendant
283. Id. at 1150.
284. Id. at 1140. The police also apparently found a "sharpening stone." See id. The
court did not explain the relevance of this piece of evidence.
285. See id. Presumably these knives had nothing to do with the murders, but they were
relevant only to the extent that they accounted for two of the empty slots in the knife
block.
286. Id. at 1]40.
287. There was no indication of whether the slash marks were fresh or old, whether
they appeared to have been made by the knife that police suspected was used in the killing,
or whether these slash marks were relevant to this case at all.
288. Id.
289. See id.
290. Id.
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and the principal went to the residence intending to commit robbery
was marginal, and in fact, Sanchez was acquitted of robbery. 291 Even if
sufficient evidence existed, the fact that they planned a robbery is not
necessarily evidence that they planned to kill. Because this was not a
felony murder prosecution, the state must show, independent of the
robbery, a deliberate and premeditated decision to kill.
Last, the manner of killing was by multiple stab wounds, appar-
ently inflicted in the frenzy of an immediate altercation, hardly a man-
ner of killing that suggested a cool, deliberate killing. The court's
rationale, apparently that the killer made repeated decisions to kill as
the struggle moved around the house, would apply equally to the
nearly identical circumstances of the killing in Anderson.292 There the
court concluded that such facts suggested a killing in a frenzy and not
the kind of premeditated killing suggested by section 189.293
B. The "Retro" Era in Perspective
Anderson and other decisions from that "middle" period appeared
to reflect the court's belief that, for better or for worse, in enacting
section 189 the legislature had spoken. The legislature decreed that a
small circumscribed category of murders were markedly more culpa-
ble than others, and premeditated and deliberated murders were
among that category. Further, given the broader homicide structure,
the elements of premeditation and deliberation had to be applied in a
manner that distinguished them from the intent to kill. Of equal im-
portance, in section 189 the legislature did not provide that some
other types of killings-for example, brutal killings of vulnerable vic-
tims committed without premeditation and deliberation-were simi-
291. See id. at 1139. The case was not prosecuted on a robbery felony murder theory,
presumably because the evidence of the intent to rob was so weak. The only evidence of a
plan to rob came from the jailhouse informant who testified regarding Sanchez's state-
ments to him. See id. at 1141. According to this informant, Sanchez either said they were
going to rob or to borrow money. See id. at 1141.
292. This rationale could easily be extended to nearly every murder that involved the
infliction of multiple wounds.
293. See People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942 (1968). The court also affirmed the suffi-
ciency of the evidence for the first degree murder of the principal's mother. Little can be
discerned from the opinion about the circumstances of her killing. What evidence there
was derived mostly from defendant's statements as related by thejailhouse informant. Like
her husband, she received extensive stab wounds and head injuries. In addition a piece of
fabric was tied loosely around her neck, and another piece was found on her right wrist.
Her body was found in her sewing room; evidence indicated that was the location of her
death. The court indicates that the evidence that she was killed in order to keep her from
being a witness to the murder of her husband was sufficient to support the verdict. See
Sanchez, 906 P.2d at 1150.
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larly serious.294 In the words of one opinion of that period, "we deem
it preeminently our duty not to seek to extend the statute but rather
to understand it and give it effect as written by the legislature. '" 295
In distinct contrast to its approach in these middle period cases,
the court now seems to regard the category of premeditated and de-
liberated murders as a sort of "catchall" for murders that the court
deems particularly reprehensible but that are not committed by one
of the other means specified in section 189.
Recent opinions attempt to minimize the impact of Anderson by
emphasizing that "[Anderson] did not refashion the elements of first
degree murder or alter the substantive law of murder in any way" 2 9 6
and that the "[t]he Anderson guidelines are descriptive, not norma-
tive." 297 The court has described the goal of Anderson as being "to aid
reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence is supportive of an
inference that the killing was the result of preexisting reflection and
weighing of considerations rather than mere unconsidered or rash
impulse." 298 Yet, rather than seeing Anderson as an "aid" to its eviden-
tiary review, the court now appears to view it as an obstacle to over-
come, a hoop that must be jumped through. While paying lip service
to the application of the categories of relevant evidence, the court has
ignored Anderson's underlying message, namely the necessity for
meaningful distinction between murders of the first and second de-
gree. The court in Anderson said,
[g]iven the presumption that an unjustified killing of a human be-
ing constitutes murder of the second, rather than of the first, de-
gree, and the clear legislative intention to differentiate between
first and second degree murder, we must determine in any case of
circumstantial evidence whether the proof is such as will furnish a
reasonable foundation for an inference of premeditation and deliber-
ation, or whether it "leaves only to conjecture and surmise the conclu-
sion that defendant either arrived at or carried out the intention to
kill as the result of a concurrence of deliberation and
premeditation."299
294. Some states explicitly incorporate such concerns into their homicide schemes. See,
e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 701.7 C (West Supp. 2001) (stating that "[a] person commits
murder in the first degree when the death of a child results from the willful or malicious
injuring, torturing, maiming or using of unreasonable force by said person.
295. People v. Bender, 163 P.2d 15, 21 (Cal. 1945).
296. People v. Thomas, 828 P.2d 101, 114 (Cal. 1992).
297. People v. Perez, 831 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Cal. 1992).
298. Id.
299. People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942, 947-48 (Cal. 1968) (quoting People v. Bender,
163 P.2d at 17) (alteration in original)).
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The court seems to have stood this observation on its head. Now,
rather than protecting against it, the court itself engages in such "con-
jecture" and "surmise" in order to sustain first degree murder convic-
tions against sufficiency of the evidence challenges.
A brief review focusing on shared characteristics of recent deci-
sions illustrates the court's current approach to evidentiary review. Be-
ginning with the "manner of killing" evidence, each of these recent
cases have in common the fact that the manner in which the killing
was accomplished provided no evidence of prior thought and reflec-
tion. Some involved killings carried out with great violence and brutal-
ity;30 0 in others the manner of killing was somewhat less violent and
brutal.30 ' But in none did the means of the killing, in itself, provide
evidence of premeditation and deliberation. 30 2 In the Anderson opin-
ion the court said,
it is well established that the brutality of a killing cannot in itself
support a finding that the killer acted with premeditation and de-
liberation. "If the evidence showed no more than the infliction of
multiple acts of violence on the victim, it would not be sufficient to
show that the killing was the result of careful thought and weighing
of considerations. "
0 3
Recent opinions do not indicate that the court now disagrees with this
view, at least theoretically. So in each of these cases, the court had to
look elsewhere, to planning activity and/or motive evidence, to estab-
lish proof of premeditation and deliberation.
However, evidence of planning and motive in these cases was sim-
ilarly problematic. Planning activity is the category of evidence most
directly probative of premeditation and deliberation. In each of these
cases the evidence of planning was flawed in one respect or another.
In some, the evidence was just remarkably weak and based on infer-
300. SeePeople v. Alcala, 685 P.2d 1126 (Cal. 1984); People v. Frank, 700 P.2d 415 (Cal.
1985); People v. Hovey, 749 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1988); People v. Pensinger, 805 P.2d 899 (Cal.
1991); Thomas, 828 P.2d at 101; Perez, 831 P.2d at 1159; People v. Sanchez, 906 P.2d 1129
(1995).
301. See People v. Wharton, 809 P.2d 290 (Cal. 1991); People v. Lucero, 750 P.2d 1342
(Cal. 1988).
302. The deaths in Alcala, Hovey, Frank, and Pensinger were a result of bizarre and per-
verse violence. In Lucero, the deaths were caused by blunt trauma and strangulation, appar-
ently accomplished with the victim's necklace. In Wharton the victim suffered blows from a
blunt instrument and died from asphyxia. In Thomas, although death was caused by gun-
shot, the victim was first severely beaten. In both Perez and Sanchez, the deaths were caused
by numerous stab wounds.
303. Anderson, 447 P.2d at 947 (quoting People v. Caldwell, 279 P.2d 539 (Cal. 1955)).
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ence and speculation.30 4 In others there was significant evidence of
planning, but the evidence did not necessarily suggest a plan to kill. 30 5
At a minimum, the evidence must be clear that defendant considered
and resolved that he was willing to kill if the need to do so arose.
Evidence that the defendant planned for another crime cannot, in
itself, establish premeditation and deliberation to kill. Not one of the
cases involved the kind of clear, unequivocal planning activity evi-
dence that could establish premeditation and deliberation on its own,
without assistance from either evidence regarding the manner of kill-
ing (concededly not present in any of these cases) or strong motive
evidence.
Motive evidence in these cases was even more elusive than plan-
ning evidence. In several of the cases the court suggested that the mo-
tive had been to eliminate a witness. In the first case in which this
argument was made, there was some evidence that defendant may
have had such an intent.30 6 Later this rationale was used indiscrimi-
nately, where facts did not indicate other eyewitnesses to the homicide
and with no suggestion that the victim had witnessed a crime other
than the potential homicide itself. In such circumstances this ratio-
nale is, in essence, merely a restatement of the fact that defendant
intended the fatal attack. 30 7 In other cases, the motive evidence cited
by the court was little more than speculation. 308
304. For example, in Wharton the "evidence" consisted primarily of unsupported
prosecutorial speculation regarding the whereabouts of the hammer before the killing.
Wharton, 809 P.2d at 303. In Thomas the court found planning based primarily on the
assumption that the accused had to go get a rifle prior to the killing. This assumption, in
turn, was based on a witness's failure to say whether; when he saw him earlier, the. defen-
dant had a rifle, this despite the fact that the witness was not asked this question. In Perez,
the court relied primarily on evidence that the defendant's car was not parked in the drive-
way of the residence, that entry into the residence was not forced, and that the defendant
might have obtained a second knife from the kitchen at some point in the deadly assault.
305. See Alcala, 685 P.2d at 1134; Hovey, 749 P.2d at 776; Frank, 700 P.2d at 415;
Pensinger, 805 P.2d at 899 (planning regarding abduction for sexual assault); Sanchez, 906
P.2d at 1129 (possible plan to commit robbery);. Lucero, 750 P.2d at 1342 (possible plan to
lure victims into defendant's home).
306. In Hovey, the defendant's cellmate testified to statements made by defendant indi-
cating that he killed the victim because the blindfold he had placed over her eyes slipped
and enabled her to see defendant so that she could later identify him to the police. See
Hovey, 749 P.2d at 780.
307. See People v. Perez, 831 P.2d 1159, 1166 (Cal. 1992) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
308. In Wharton, the court suggested the motive might have been theft, based on the
fact that defendant had apparently taken property from the victim earlier, although the
court itself admitted such evidence was weak. See Wharton, 809 P.2d at 351. In Thomas, the
prosecutor had argued a sexual motive, though no evidence of a sexual assault was offered.
The trial judge described the killing as "without apparent motive, nor any rhyme or rea-
son." People v. Thomas, 828 P.2d 101, 138 (Cal. 1992). On appeal the court relied upon
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According to the Anderson opinion, cases in which the court
found sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation typically
had evidence in all three categories. 30 9 Not one of these cases had
substantial evidence in any of the categories.
One other aspect of recent decisions echoes the court's earliest
doctrinal period-that is the re-emerging emphasis on the potentially
instantaneous nature of these mental states. With increasing regular-
ity, after a review of evidence that suggests a last minute decision to
kill, the court then notes, " [t] he true test is not the duration of time as
much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each
other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be ar-
rived at quickly." 310 From the beginning, this issue of the time re-
quired to premeditate and deliberate has plagued any effort to
distinguish these elements from the intent to kill. If the thoughts con-
stituting premeditation and deliberation can occur with such "great
rapidity," what distinguishes them from the intent to kill? Can any
ephemeral difference that might exist have been intended to justify
the determination of whether someone lived or died? In this regard,
the court's suggestion that actions taken in the midst of a deadly as-
sault may support an inference that a cool, reflective thought process
sufficient to constitute premeditation and deliberation occurred is es-
pecially troubling.311
The court no longer makes any serious pretense of distinguishing
first from second degree murder. Its result-oriented manipulation of
Anderson factors, coupled with repeated reliance on the "great rapid-
ity" with which an accused can deliberate and premeditate, has re-
sulted in first degree murder convictions being affirmed where there
was no substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation, where
the crime is indistinguishable from an intentional but unplanned
murder. The Anderson categories are important not because they were
listed in an opinion written more than thirty years ago. Rather, they
are important, indeed critical, because these categories describe the
kinds of evidence that are logically relevant to determining whether
the accused engaged in the kind of forethought and reflection in-
volved in premeditation and deliberation. As the court's recent deci-
elimination of the witness theory. See id at 116. In Lucero, the court alluded again to the
"elimination of the witness" motive, but conceded that motive evidence is not strong. See
Lucero, 750 P.2d at 1348-49.
309. See People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942, 949 (Cal. 1968).
310. Sanchez, 906 P.2d at 1149 (quoting Perez, 831 P.2d at 1159, quoting Thomas, 156
P.2d at 7).
311. See id. at 1149.
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sions demonstrate, if these factors are not applied honestly and
rigorously, the current statutorily defined difference between first and
second degree murder simply evaporates.
C. A Coda: People v. Cortez
The most recent evidence of how far the court has retreated to-
ward its earliest doctrinal period came in People v. Cortez,3 1 2 a case in
which the court considered the requirements for proof of conspiracy to
commit murder, rather than direct consideration of the elements of
murder itself. The defendant was charged with murder for the death
of a companion based on allegations that his actions provoked the
response of rival gang members who killed the companion. 31 3 He was
also charged with conspiracy to commit murder on the theory that he
agreed with his companion (the victim of the murder) to murder one
or more members of the rival gang.3 14 The jury was unable to reach a
verdict on the murder charge but did convict on the conspiracy
charge. On appeal the defendant argued that the trial court had erred
in failing to require the jury to determine the degree of the murder
alleged as the target offense of the conspiracy. The court considered
whether the crime of conspiracy to commit murder is divisible into
degrees with differing punishments, or instead, is a unitary crime, with
the same penalty as first degree murder.31 5
In a conspiracy to murder, the participants must intend to kill.31 6
In Cortez the majority held that intent to kill plus conspiratorial agree-
ment equals conspiracy to commit first degree murder. In so holding,
312. 960 P.2d 537 (Cal. 1998).
313. Under the rubric of implied malice, the California Supreme Court has held that if
two persons engage in so-called "provocative acts," and in response a third party kills one
of the two, the survivor may be prosecuted for murder of his cohort. See Taylor v. Superior
Court, 477 P.2d 131 (Cal. 1970); Pizano v. Superior Court, 577 P.2d 659 (Cal. 1978); In re
Joseph R., 612 P.2d 927 (Cal. 1980).
314. See Cortez, 960 P.2d at 539.
315. See id. at 538. The court does not characterize the crime as a conspiracy to commit
first degree murder. Rather, the court speaks in terms of conspiracy to commit murder
simpliciter, a crime punishable with the same penalty as first degree murder. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 182 (Lexis Supp. 2002). As Justice Kennard points out in dissent, the crime of
murder simpliciter does not exist. See Cortez, 960 P.2d at 553 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
316. See People v. Swain, 909 P.2d 994 (Cal. 1996). Conspiracy requires proof of two
intents-the intent to engage in concerted action and the intent to commit the target
crime. See id. at 994. In Swain, the court recognized that when two or more people agree to
commit murder, by definition they intend to kill, and therefore that a conspiracy to com-
mit implied malice murder was logically impossible.
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the majority appeared to equate conspiratorial agreement with pre-
meditation and deliberation.317
Closer examination of the majority's underlying assumptions
highlights the implications of this equation. While agreeing that most
conspiracies to commit murder would be to commit first degree mur-
der, in dissent Justice Kennard argued that a conspiracy to commit
second degree murder was theoretically possible. To illustrate her
point, she suggested the following situations:
[W]ith a shout of "let's get him," two friends who have been drink-
ing all night in a bar can, without premeditation and deliberation,
impulsively form and share the intent to kill when their sworn en-
emy walks in. Similarly, a sudden and unexpected encounter on
disputed turf between groups from two different gangs can simi-
larly lead to a spontaneous and unreflective agreement to kill.3 18
The majority opinion expressed no disagreement with Justice
Kennard's supposition that these examples illustrate conspiracies, and
thus apparently was willing to assume that these informal, spontane-
ous understandings were sufficient to constitute "agreement" for pur-
poses of conspiracy liability. Given the majority's equation of
conspiratorial agreement with premeditation and deliberation, one
can infer that the majority's view of premeditation and deliberation is
similarly limited.3 19
Using a slight variation on Justice Kennard's example, the impli-
cations of Cortez beyond the realm of conspiracy become apparent.
Assume one man at the bar sees his enemy enter and impulsively de-
cides to and does kill him. Presumably he has committed intentional
317. See Cortez, 960 P.2d at 548 (Mosk, J., concurring). There is no indication in the
Cortez decision that the court has reverted to a position that equates premeditation and
deliberation with the intent to kill.
318. Id. at 554 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
319. The majority's approving quote from Justice Mosk's concurring opinion in Swain,
supports this inference:
[Conspiracy to commit murder] does not require, as a factual matter, a premedi-
tated and deliberate intent to kill unlawfully. But an intent of such character is pre-
sent in the context of a conspiracy, practically by definition, because it does not
arise of a sudden within a single person but is necessarily formed and then shared
by at least two persons.
Cortez, 960 P.2d at 543.
WhatJustice Mosk meant when he said "an intent of such character is present in the
context of a conspiracy, practically by definition" is not clear. The inclusion of the word
"practically" suggests there might be circumstances in which such an intent would not be
present (otherwise he simply could have said "by definition"). However, ifJustice Mosk was
suggesting this possibility, then he presumably would have agreed with Justice Kennard
whose dissent was premised on her belief that a conspiracy to commit second degree mur-
der is theoretically possible.
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second degree murder. If, before acting on his decision, he pauses
long enough to say to himself, "I'm going to do it," has he then com-
mitted premeditated and deliberate first degree murder? The ratio-
nale of the decision in Cortez suggests the majority's answer would be
yes.
In deciding Cortez, the court considered at length two earlier deci-
sions: People v. Kynette320 and People v. Horn.32 1 Kynette, decided in 1940
near the end of the earliest doctrinal period, held that conspiracy to
commit murder was, as a matter of law, conspiracy to commit first
degree murder. 322 Horn, decided thirty-four years after Kynette, held
that an agreement between two persons to kill, if reached without mal-
ice aforethought, would constitute conspiracy to commit voluntary
manslaughter.32 3 The Horn opinion criticized the reasoning in Kynette
and suggested that, if two persons agreed to kill but did so without
premeditation and deliberation, the resulting conspiracy would be to
commit second degree murder. 324
The majority in Cortez concluded that the authority of the Horn
decision had been undercut by two later developments-the 1981
amendment to section 189 providing that premeditation and delibera-
tion did not require "mature and meaningful reflection"3 25 and the
statutory abolition of the "diminished capacity" defense. 326 The court
therefore concluded Horn was no longer good law.32 7 This argument
is simply a red herring. Neither of these changes affected in any way
the central question of Cortez-"whether proof of an agreement to kill
necessarily and inevitably establishes premeditation and deliberation
320. 104 P.2d 794 (Cal. 1940).
321. 524 P.2d 1300 (Cal. 1974).
322. The issue before the court in the Kynette case was whether the trial court acted
improperly when it excused certain jurors who were conscientiously opposed to the death
penalty. Kynette, 104 P.2d at 801. The court held that that there was no error because
conspiracy to commit murder was, by definition, conspiracy to commit first degree murder,
at that time a capital crime subject to the death penalty or life imprisonment. See id.
323. The defendants in Horn had argued that, because of their state of intoxication,
they did not act with malice aforethought and premeditation and deliberation as would be
required to constitute conspiracy to commit first degree murder. That is, they contended
that the proof of their intoxication tended to prove the nonexistence of required mental
states. Introduction of such evidence to "disprove" mental state came to be referred to as a
"defense of diminished capacity." (See Mounts, supra note 27, at 353-59 for discussion of
why this label was a "misnomer.") The facts in the Horn case and the legal doctrine applica-
ble at the time the case was decided made the opinion's use of the premeditation and
deliberation terminology of Wolff and of diminished capacity terminology a given.
324. See Horn, 524 P.2d at 1305-06.
325. See discussion supra Part V.
326. See discussion supra Part V.
327. See Cortez, 960 P.2d at 544.
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or their equivalent?" 328 This question is impossible to answer without
first clearly resolving the related questions of "what is meant by pre-
meditation and deliberation?" How are these elements affirmatively
defined?
The amendment to section 189, by its express language, ad-
dressed only the question of what is not required to prove premedita-
tion and deliberation; it made no pretense of defining what is
required to prove these mental elements. In other words, the amend-
ment sheds no light on the affirmative definition of these elements.
The argument based on the "abolition" of the diminished capacity
defense similarly misses the point. The defendant's argument in Cortez
was not a "diminished capacity" argument. He made no argument that
intoxication or mental disease or defect interfered with his ability to
premeditate or deliberate (or engage in similar mental processes vis-a-
vis the agreement). Rather, he argued that the state had not met its
affirmative burden of proving the mental state required.
Horn's relevance to Cortez had nothing to do with the Wolff defini-
tion of premeditation and deliberation or the diminished capacity de-
fense. Rather its relevance was premised on a more essential
message-reaffirmation of what was first explicitly articulated in People
v. Holt,3 29 decided four years after Kynette and thirty years before Horn.
There the court observed: "Dividing . . . homicides into murder
and . . . manslaughter was a recognition of the infirmity of human
nature. Again dividing the offense of murder into two degrees is a
further recognition of that infirmity and of difference in the quantum
of personal turpitude of the offenders. '330 Horn reaffirmed this mes-
sage by its clear recognition of the three distinct forms of intentional
homicide created by California's statutory scheme-second degree
murder based on intent to kill, voluntary manslaughter based on a
mitigated intent to kill,3 31 and first degree murder based on intent to
328. Later cases involving malice aforethought show that "abolition" of the diminished
capacity defense does nothing to eliminate such questions. See People v. Saille, 820 P.2d
588 (Cal. 1991); People v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272 (Cal. 1994); In re Christian S., 872 P.2d
574 (Cal. 1994). See also Mounts, supra note 27, at 359-69.
329. 153 P.2d 21 (Cal. 1944).
330. Id. at 37.
331. In People v. Horn, 524 P.2d 1300 (Cal. 1974), the mitigation was based on intoxica-
tion; this form of mitigation may no longer be recognized. See People v. Saille, 820 P.2d
588, 598-99 (Cal. 1991). However, the intent to kill may still be mitigated by adequate
provocation. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(a) (Lexis Supp. 2002); or imperfect self-defense,
In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 583 (Cal. 1994). If two persons agree to kill in circum-
stances involving a recognized form of mitigation, presumably the rationale of Horn would
still apply and lead to a conviction of conspiracy to commit voluntary manslaughter.
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kill plus premeditation and deliberation-and by its further recogni-
tion of the court's obligation to apply the law in a manner that mean-
ingfully implemented that statutory structure.
The majority opinion in Cortez reflects little interest in, or appre-
ciation of, that message. Indeed, the majority's ability to resolve the
case with so little consideration of the meaning of premeditation and
deliberation is startling. In the entire opinion, the court's only refer-
ence to the definition of premeditation and deliberation was a reitera-
tion of the dictionary definitions of those words. As if to banish any
serious reflection on those definitions, the opinion followed immedi-
ately with the familiar admonishment that "[t] he process of premedi-
tation and deliberation does not require any extended period of
time[;] ... [t]houghts may follow each other with great rapidity and
cold calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly."332
Conclusion
The entire question of degrees of murder is ripe, indeed over-
ripe, for legislative attention. Were it to address the issue, the legisla-
ture first would face a critical decision whether to simply eliminate
degrees of murder, or instead retain the two degrees but revise and/
or clarify the bases of distinction. Changes in the homicide scheme
driven by the decisions in Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia,333
may argue in favor of eliminating the degrees of murder. The original
role of first degree murder, limiting application of the death penalty,
has been supplanted substantially by the "special circumstances"
scheme enacted in response to these decisions. As a result, a persua-
sive argument could be made that the degrees of murder no longer
play any essential role in the larger homicide scheme. 334
332. Cortez, 960 P.2d 537, 542 (Cal. 1998).
333. See discussion supra Part I.
334. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1 cmt. at 2, 3; 210.6 cmt. at 1 (1980) (takes no
position regarding the death penalty; recommends elimination of degrees of murder). Ala-
bama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah define capital murder and non-capital
murder, with no further subdivision of non-capital murder. See supra note 5. In addition,
Maine, which has no death penalty, does not subdivide murder into degrees. See id.
In California, with the exception of premeditation and deliberation, virtually all fac-
tors that define first degree murder (by means of a destructive device or explosive, torture,
lying in wait, poison, in the course of the enumerated felonies, by discharging a firearm
from a motor vehicle with the intent to kill) are incorporated already to a greater or lesser
degree within the special circumstances scheme. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West Supp.
2002).
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Alternatively, the legislature could decide that non-capital mur-
der encompasses a sufficiently broad range of culpability to justify re-
taining its division into degrees. If so, the legislature would next
decide whether the current grounds should be maintained or other
bases for distinction adopted.335 If the current grounds are retained,
the legislature must resolve existing ambiguities. Are premeditation
and deliberation elements distinct from the intent to kill? If so, on
what basis is a premeditated and deliberated murder distinguished
from one that is simply intentional? If not, what distinction between
the two degrees of murder was intended? If the legislature elected to
discard the current bases of distinction, it must then find alternative
grounds that both reflect current societal consensus regarding the
right balance between culpability and harm and also allow for princi-
pled application.
Little suggests that the legislature is inclined to address these is-
sues. The defects in California's homicide scheme have been apparent
for decades, if not centuries, and for well over fifty years scholars and
members of the court regularly have called for legislative action. 336
Despite glaring flaws in all aspects of the statutory homicide scheme,
the legislature persistently has refused to respond in any meaningful
way.33 7
The court cannot escape the issue as easily as the legislature. As it
faces evidentiary challenges to premeditation and deliberation the
court must be mindful of the broader homicide scheme and apply
these elements in a manner that ensures first degree murder measura-
bly differs from second degree. The court must resist the temptation
to rewrite the statute to incorporate its own standards of culpability,
even if those standards are arguably superior to those incorporated in
the statute as written and are shared by society at large. While in the
short run, such judicial rewriting might lead to the "right result," in
the long run, it perpetuates the impenetrable, byzantine quality of
California's homicide law, where nothing is ever as it seems, and un-
335. Among the states which have two or more degrees of murder, a number have
moved away from reliance on premeditation and deliberation as a basis for distinguishing
first degree murder and adopted new criteria in line with more modem notions of culpa-
bility. See, e.g., Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Louisiana, New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. See supra note 5.
336. See, e.g., People v. Valentine, 169 P.2d 1, 15-16 (Cal. 1946) (Spence, J., concur-
ring); In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 584-85 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., concurring); Charles
L. Hobson, Reforming California's Homicide Law, 23 PEPP. L. REv. 495 (1996); Mounts, supra
note 27, at 376; Herbert Packer, The Case for Revision of the Penal Code, 13 STAN. L. Rev. 252,
255-56 (1961).
337. See discussion supra Part V.
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dermines any integrity of the overall statutory scheme. 338 Further-
more, by getting to the "right result" without statutory authorization,
the court eliminates the pressure on the legislature to address Califor-
nia's profoundly flawed homicide statutes. Over two decades ago, a
leading criminal law scholar identified California as the only major
state with a nineteenth century penal code. 33 9 Since then, a new cen-
tury has arrived and nothing has changed.
338. See Mounts, supra note 27, at 375, 377.
339. See FLETCHER, supra note 14, at 241.
[Vol. 36
